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Preface 
The U.S. debate on immigration has been framed by a simplistic “human rights versus national 
security” paradigm that has inhibited serious discussion of the role of the U.S. immigration 
system in a coordinated national security strategy.  The debate has been further hampered by the 
paucity of counter-terror experts who understand the immigration system, and by a lack of 
security expertise in the immigrant rights community.  This project attempts to bridge that divide. 
 
The stakes could not be higher.  The threat of catastrophic terrorism, coupled with the 
vulnerabilities exposed by the September 11th attacks, demands that the U.S. immigration system 
be integrated into a comprehensive national security plan.  At the same time, U.S. prosperity—
a key component of US national security—depends on America’s openness to the foreign-born 
and, even more, on America’s adherence to its defining values.  
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Catholic Legal Immigration 
Network, Inc. (CLINIC) began to meet with counter-terror experts to explore how the U.S. 
immigration system should be reformed to further the nation’s security.  Vincent Cannistraro, 
former Chief of Operations and Analysis at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, and Harry 
Brandon, former Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI and head of National Security and 
Counterterrorism, served as indispensable guides in the early stages of this process.  
In 2004, CLINIC approached the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP for 
pro bono representation in a project that CLINIC hoped would produce a comprehensive analysis 
of the role of immigration policy in national security.  Between November 2004 and April 2005, 
a team of Fried Frank attorneys—comprised of Michael Bromwich (lead partner), Beth Colleye, 
Alida Barletta, and Jennifer Wollenberg—conducted extensive research and interviews with 
eight security experts from a variety of backgrounds.  
These experts were Daniel Benjamin, a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a former National Security Council director for 
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2transnational threats (1998-1999), and co-author of The Next Attack (Henry Holt and Co., 2005); 
Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at  the RAND 
Corporation, and author of Inside Terrorism (Colombia University Press, 1998); Susan Ginsburg, 
Senior Counsel and team leader for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, and author of Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy
(Migration Policy Institute, 2006); Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, the Lyndon B. Johnson 
Centennial Chair in National Policy at the University of Texas’s School of Public Affairs, 
formerly Deputy Director for the CIA (1981-1982), and Director of the National Security Agency 
(1977-1981); Sheila Horan, former Deputy Assistant Director for the FBI’s National Security 
Division (1999-2001) and Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office’s National 
Security Division (Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism) (1997-1999); Cmdr. Stephen E. 
Flynn, U.S.C.G., ret., Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, former consultant to the U.S. Commission on National Security (the Hart-Rudman 
Commission (2000-2001)), and author of America the Vulnerable (Harper Collins, 2004); Larry 
Johnson, CEO of BERG Associates, LLC, former Deputy Director of the U.S. State 
Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism (1989-1993), and a former CIA employee (1985-
1989); and James Ziglar, former INS Commissioner (2001-2002).     
The interviews covered a range of issues, but the experts consistently returned to two key 
themes: (1) what the United States must do to reduce the threat of terrorism; and (2) what role the 
U.S. immigration system should play in a security strategy.  This report attempts to answer those 
questions.  It does not attempt to offer an inventory, assessment or consensus view of all the post-
9/11 security-related immigration restrictions.  Instead, it provides a framework for evaluating 
security-related immigration measures, and seeks to contribute to a richer debate on the role of 
immigration in national security.    
The report will begin with a brief introduction to the post-9/11 security-related immigration 
restrictions.  It will then discuss three broad concepts—national security, the rule of law, and 
human rights—concepts that have defined and limited the debate on immigration since 
September 11th. The report argues that these concepts, properly understood, allow for an 
enlarged and richer discussion of the relevant issues.  The report will next set forth a 
methodology for measuring the success of immigration-related security measures, using the US-
VISIT program as a case study.  It will then discuss key counter-terror priorities that do not 
directly involve immigration.  It will end by identifying the many roles that the U.S. immigration 
system—and immigrants themselves—should play in furthering the nation’s security. 
I. Introduction 
 
In reconstructing the September 11th attacks, the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (“the 9/11 Commission”) identified various immigration 
vulnerabilities that the terrorists exploited.  The hijackers used fraudulent passports, obtained 
visas on false pretenses, and violated the terms of their visas.  The names of two of the hijackers 
were known to the intelligence community and were the subject of intensive tracking, but this 
information was not shared with US immigration officials.  The Commission concluded that 15 
3of the 19 hijackers could have been intercepted by immigration authorities had these authorities 
been aware of and put in place measures to counter the terrorists’ travel tactics, in particular 
those relating to the use of travel documents.1 The Commission concluded that US authorities 
missed abundant opportunities for these and other reasons to intercept and arrest the terrorists 
prior to the attacks. 
Why were the terrorists not intercepted?  The Commission concluded that US immigration 
authorities, prior to 9/11, were not focused on security.  Instead, their primary concern was 
preventing people from entering the United States and seeking unauthorized employment.  
Because the terrorists did not appear to have any interest in working illegally in the United States, 
they were not perceived to be threatening by US immigration officials, and were allowed into the 
United States.  After finding his mien to be hostile and suspicious, immigration officials turned 
away the person who appears to have been selected as the “20th hijacker,” Mohammed al-
Qahtani, at the Orlando, Florida port of entry because he had no hotel reservation or return 
ticket.2
If prior to the attacks national security did not represent a major priority for the U.S. 
immigration system, after 9/11 the immigration system has been viewed almost exclusively 
through the lens of security.  Security-related measures have transformed virtually all U.S. 
immigration procedures, and immigration has become a defining feature of U.S. efforts to 
strengthen homeland security. 
In the name of national security, US officials took extraordinary measures after 9/11.   Most 
visibly, federal officials arrested and detained 768 Middle-Eastern and South Asian men in the 
weeks following the attacks.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) encountered most of the 
detainees in its investigation and attempt to prevent further attacks.  The use of the immigration 
system to prevent attacks and as a proxy for terrorist prosecutions had been previously 
considered but was now put into effect on a dramatic scale, and without the possibility of public 
scrutiny.  This represented a dramatic shift in tactics.  The Department of Justice (DOJ) held 
detainees for immigration violations and ultimately deported 531 after closed hearings.3 DOJ 
reported to the 9/11 Commission that six detainees had direct links to terrorist organizations and 
that the overall preventive detention program had provided important leads.  DOJ’s internal 
watchdog, the Office of Inspector General, criticized the gross mistreatment of hundreds of 
detainees in U.S. custody and the lengthy detention and removal of those with only the most 
attenuated ties to the terrorist investigation.4
Congress also acted quickly to pass anti-terrorism legislation that included provisions relating 
 
1 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report” (W.W. 
Norton and Company, Inc., 2004) at 384 [hereinafter “The 9/11 Commission Report”]; The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “9/11 and Terrorist Travel: A Staff Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” (Hillsboro Press, June 2004). 
2 D. Eggen, “9/11 Panel Faults US for Letting Hijackers In,” Washington Post (January 27, 2004). 
3 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 328. 
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, “The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the 
Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 
Attacks” (Apr. 2003) [hereinafter “The September 11 Detainees.”]. 
4to immigration on the theory that tougher immigration laws might have prevented 9/11 and might 
stop a future attack.  The United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”)5—was signed 
into law on October 26, 2001, and expanded the security-related grounds for denying admission 
to and for removing (deporting) non-citizens.  The USA PATRIOT Act also allowed for pre-
charge detention for seven days of those non-citizens certified by the Attorney General as 
terrorists or terrorist supporters.  (An earlier regulation had allowed pre-charge detention for a 
“reasonable period of time” in an “emergency or other extraordinary circumstances.”6) Other 
detention measures rhetorically linked to counterterrorism included the decision to detain all 
Haitian boat people,7 and to oppose the release of non-citizens denied admission to the United 
States at U.S. ports-of-entry, whose nations would not accept their repatriation.8
Several security-related changes likewise occurred in the issuance of visas and the admission 
of non-citizens.  On January 11, 2002, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) began to require all 
male visa applicants between the ages of 16 and 45 and women at select consular posts to fill out 
a supplemental form that required detailed, security-relevant information.  In July 2003, DOS 
mandated that consular officials conduct face-to-face interviews with most visa applicants.9 The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 formalized this policy.10 
The Visa Waiver Program (VWP)—by which nationals of certain countries can enter the 
United States as visitors for business or pleasure without securing a visa, or undergoing a 
consular interview or pre-inspection procedures—has long been viewed as a source of 
vulnerability to the United States.  Those opposed to the program argue that the lack of a 
consular application and interview for VWP participants means that non-citizens traveling under 
the provisions of the VWP are less likely to be scrutinized for terrorist connections.  As a result 
of fears that the program created a security threat, the United States removed Argentina (February 
2002) and Uruguay (April 2003) from the program, and Congress mandated regular reviews of 
participating countries.   
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 200211 required DOS to 
determine that non-immigrant visa applicants from nations designated as “state sponsors of 
 
5 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
6 66 Fed. Reg. 48334 (Sept. 20, 2001). 
7 Fed. Reg. 68924 (Nov. 13, 2002) (“A surge in illegal migration by sea threatens national security by diverting 
valuable United States Coast Guard and other resources from counter-terrorism ...”); In re D-J-, 23 I & N Dec. 572 
(A.G. 2003) (“[T]here is a substantial prospect that the release of such aliens .... [would] encourage future surges in 
illegal migration by sea ... diverting valuable Coast Guard and DOJ resources from counterterrorism and homeland 
security responsibilities.”). 
8 Brief for the Petitioners, Clark v. Suarez Martinez, No. 03-878 (U.S. May 2004) ([A]s recent events have taught, 
the Cuban government is not the only foreign power or organization that thinks little of putting civilian lives at risk 
as part of its hostile endeavors.  It is difficult to understate the damage that could occur to the United States’ 
international relations and national security if ... foreign powers are told that the President and Congress cannot 
control the physical infiltration into the United States of criminals and other aliens...”). 
9 68 Fed. Reg. 40127 (Jul. 7, 2003). 
10 Pub. L. No. 108-408, § 5301, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004).  
11 Pub. L. 107-173, § 306 (May 14, 2002). 
5terror”—currently, North Korea, Cuba, Syria, the Sudan, Iran, and Libya—do not pose a security 
threat to the United States.  Nationals from these countries who are aged 16 or over must 
complete a detailed form explaining their affiliations and travel history, and undergo consular 
interviews.   In addition, the United States instituted new security advisory opinions for visa 
applicants from twenty-six (26) nations of security interest (the “Visa Condor” program), and for 
visa applicants who work in areas involving sensitive technology (the “Visa Mantis” program).  
In December 2001, the United States and Canada concluded a “smart border” agreement 
designed to increase security while facilitating the lawful cross-border movement of persons and 
goods.  As part of this agreement, the two nations entered into a safe-third country agreement that 
took effect on December 29, 2004.   This agreement requires migrants, with exceptions, to seek 
asylum in whichever of the two countries they first enter.   
As a feature of its National Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS), the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) required male visitors over the age of 16 from twenty-
five (25) nations to register for fingerprinting, photographing, and interviews.  Between 
November 2002 and December 2003, 83,519 persons reported to authorities to register under this 
program.  DHS placed 13,799 registrants in removal proceedings and detained 2,870.  The “call-
in” registration requirement has since been suspended, although visitors continue to be 
summoned on a case-by-case basis.  
Well before 9/11, the Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“the 1996 Act” or “IIRAIRA”)12 had required the INS to create a comprehensive “check 
in/check out” system for foreign visitors.  This system had never been completed, but the task 
assumed a new life following the September 11th attacks.  By the end of 2005, DHS had 
instituted “entry” (check-in) procedures for its U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indication 
Technology program (US-VISIT) at 115 airports, 15 seaports, and 154 land ports-of-entry (in 
secondary inspection), and exit procedures at 13 airports and two seaports.13 US-VISIT is 
intended to verify the identity and run security checks on all temporary visitors to the United 
States, and will record their entry to and exit from the country.  US-VISIT will ultimately 
subsume the Student Exchange and Visitor Information System (SEVIS), a student-tracking 
program that received significant attention after September 11th. It will likewise replace the 
NSEERS program. 
On March 1, 2003, DHS came into being, incorporating the former INS and 21 other federal 
agencies.  In one fell swoop, the U.S. immigration function became a homeland security concern. 
The creation of DHS represented the largest U.S. government restructuring since World War II, 
but it did not represent the extent of security-related institutional reforms.  The FBI and CIA also 
began a process of significant restructuring and reform. 
Several initiatives since September 11th have targeted the undocumented and unauthorized.  
Spending on border enforcement activities and on detention bed space has increased 
dramatically.  In the 2006 appropriations bill, DHS received funding for 1,000 additional Border 
 
12 Pub. L. 104-208, § 110, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). 
13 E. Lipton, “Border Control Takes One Leap Forward,” New York Times (Dec. 30, 2005). 
6Patrol Agents and $90 million for additional detention beds.  DHS has also conducted 
immigration raids at work places that terrorists might try to infiltrate, including “critical 
infrastructure” and nationally significant sites.  Nuclear plants, airports, military bases, and 
national sports venues have been a focus of these raids. On the legislative front, the REAL-ID 
Act of 200514 seeks to compel states to deny drivers’ licenses to the undocumented.  At the same 
time, the Bush Administration supports “guest worker” legislation and Congress is considering 
various immigration reform bills that would extend legal status to undocumented immigrant 
laborers.  
In the two years following the attacks, the admission of refugees—persons with a well-founded 
fear of persecution based on political opinion, social group, race, religion, or nationality—dipped 
from 68,925 (2001) to 26,839 in 2002 and 28,306 in 2003.15 The DHS also completed a 
comprehensive security review of this program after allegations that terrorists might use it to 
enter the United States.  (Following the review, admissions rose to 52,868 in 2004 and 53,813 in 
2005.)16  Recently, the DHS has extended the “expedited removal” process beyond ports-of-entry 
to non-citizens, including asylum-seekers, caught along the U.S.-Mexico border.  This decision 
comes in the wake of a comprehensive report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom that found that the expedited removal system directly (and improperly) repatriated many 
persons who expressed a fear of return to their countries.17 Finally, the USA PATRIOT Act and 
the REAL-ID Act have created an overly broad bar on admission for those who provide “material 
support” for terrorist activity, terrorists or terrorist organizations.  This provision has led to the 
exclusion of literally thousands of refugees and delays in the cases of hundreds of asylum-seekers 
who opposed brutal regimes or involuntarily supported anti-government groups. 
Although hardly comprehensive, this short summary of post-9/11 security-related immigration 
reforms highlights the prominence of immigration in the current national security debate.  
II. Reclaiming the Terms of the Debate   
 
It has been said that clichés should begin debates, not end them.  Yet too often in the debate on 
immigration and security, catch phrases like “national security,” “the rule of law,” and “human 
rights” have been used to limit discussion.  A robust analysis of these concepts is in order, 
because properly understood, they can serve as useful tools for analyzing immigration measures 
and making security choices.       
A. National Security 
Although often viewed as synonymous with protection from physical harm, the term “national 
security” rightly deserves a more expansive meaning, going beyond mere physical protection to 
 
14 Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics” (2005), Table 14.  
16 Congressional Research Service, “Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy” (updated Jan. 25, 2006) at 2. 
17 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, 
Volume II  (Feb. 2005) at 20-23 [hereinafter “Report on Asylum Seekers”]. 
7encompass the protection of “vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could 
threaten the fundamental values and vitality of the state.”18 This broader sense of security 
recognizes how economic and political interests serve as a touchstone of state power.19 
Economic viability and strength contribute directly to security.  So does adherence to values.  
Because “national security” policies and strategies in a democracy depend on public support, they 
must reflect “basic public values.”20 In the U.S. constitutional system, core “public values” 
include respect for civil liberties and human rights.  
An expanded view of “national security” makes it more likely that our strategies will be 
coherent, and that the relevant government agencies and institutions will contribute to them.  A 
broad concept of security also provides a framework for considering key trade-offs.21 For 
example, detention of asylum-seekers at the border might initially appear to be a useful security 
tool if “security” were defined as keeping migrants in detention until their cases have been 
processed to a conclusion.  Such detention might not be a sustainable tool, however, if it offends 
public values, or makes certain U.S. allies less likely to participate in counter-terror efforts or to 
share intelligence with the United States, or dissuades needed foreign workers from coming to 
the United States.  Similarly, enhanced screening at ports-of-entry might appear to promote 
safety in the short-term, but could have economic consequences that would undermine the 
nation’s long-term security if the difficulties of getting people and goods into the United States 
were to cause multi-national corporations to do business elsewhere.   
The United States has recognized this kind of “security” trade-off in its “smart border” 
agreement with Canada, which attempts to increase safety while at the same time facilitating the 
flow of lawful border traffic.  Security-related restrictions on the issuance of visas might be 
necessary, but they must be weighed against their impact on the employment needs of U.S. 
corporations and the long-term benefits of training and educating foreign students.  An expanded 
view of security recognizes the importance of deciding who the United States will admit, as 
much as deciding who it keeps out.22 
There may also be trade-offs between national security-related measures and other interests.23 
18 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, American National Security (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 5th ed., 1999) at 3 [hereinafter “American National Security”].   
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 50. 
21 Comments by James Jay Carafano, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, Second Annual Policy and Legal 
Conference of CLINIC, Migration Policy Institute, and Georgetown University Law School (May 24, 2005) 
(“Security-related concerns could be terrorism, criminality, public safety, economic security, and measures that 
further one may undermine another.”). 
22 Testimony of Stephen E. Flynn, Senior Fellow in National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, before 
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Subcommittee on 
Border Security, Citizenship and Immigration (Mar. 12, 2003) [hereinafter “Flynn Testimony of March 12, 2003] 
(“U.S. prosperity – and much of its power – relies on its ready access to North American and global networks of 
transport, energy, information, finance, and labor.  It is self-defeating to embrace security measures that end up 
isolating it from those networks.”). 
23 Interview with Cmdr. Stephen E. Flynn, U.S.C.G., ret., Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council 
on Foreign Relations  (Mar. 7, 2005) [hereinafter “Flynn Interview”] (“Security measures must be sustainable over 
the long-term and, in our system, they won’t be if they violate civil rights.”). 
8Since 9/11, the government has largely conflated national security and immigration enforcement, 
justifying virtually all of its immigration restrictions on national security grounds.  This may be 
understandable, given that the U.S. immigration function now resides in a homeland security 
agency.  It cannot be blindly assumed, however, that all immigration enforcement activities 
invariably further security.  Among other concerns, they may make immigrants less likely to 
come forward with security-related intelligence.24 
B. The Rule of Law    
 
The “rule of law” plays an oversized role in the debate on immigration and security.  The 
ancient Greeks used the term to refer to a legal system that subordinates government to the law.  
Most definitions of the rule of law continue to focus on the ends such a system should serve.  
These can include (1) government adherence to standing laws (with judicial review); (2) “law 
and order” in the sense of protection of the lives, rights and property of residents; (3) equality 
before the law; (4) human rights, and (5) efficient and predictable justice.25 A dysfunctional legal 
system may not encompass all of these goals.  For example, a repressive government might be 
bound by the law, but still violate human rights.  In other words, government by law may be an 
essential, but not sufficient condition to the rule of law.26 In addition, in a fledgling or fragile 
legal system, attempts to further one goal (respect for human rights) may undermine another (law 
and order).27 Conversely, the failure to respect one goal (human rights) may create conditions 
that would undermine another (law and order).  In a well-functioning system, however, these 
goals should reinforce one another.  
Others define the rule of law not by the larger ends that such a system serves, but by its 
institutional attributes (its laws, judiciary, and police).28 For example, a legal system might 
exemplify the rule of law if its rules were: (1) prospective and possible to comply with; (2) 
promulgated, clear, and coherent; (3) stable enough to allow persons to be guided by knowledge 
of their content; (4) the basis of decrees and orders governing specific situations; (5) binding on 
those with the authority to make, administer and apply rules; and (6) administered consistently.29 
The pre-conditions for such a system might include an independent judiciary, open court 
 
24 Center for Migration Studies, Immigration Policy, Law Enforcement and National Security (2003) at 12 
[hereinafter “CMS Special Report”] (As Vincent Cannistraro has put it: “[I]f the FBI conducts sensitive interviews 
with community leaders at the same time that that community’s members have been rounded up ... forced to report—
and everyone who reports knows that if they are illegal, they are not a document holder, that they can and will be 
deported—we have really eliminated the ability to get information that we really need.”). 
25 Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, “Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law,” Carnegie Papers, Rule of Law Series, No. 
55 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jan. 2005) at 5-6 [hereinafter “Competing Definitions of the Rule 
of Law”]. 
26 Id. at 9 (“Binding the government to rule by law is the sine qua non of the rule of law.”). 
27 Id. at 24.
28 Id. at 6. 
29 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) at 270-271 [hereinafter “Natural 
Law and Natural Rights”]; see also Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law & Its Virtue,” The Authority of Law: Essays on 
Law & Morality (Oxford University Press, 1979); Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
9proceedings, judicial review, and legal counsel for the poor.30 Still others adopt hybrid 
definitions, combining both ends and institutional attributes.31 
Both sides of the immigration debate find “rule of law” problems in the U.S. immigration 
system.  Immigration restrictionists see the “rule of law” as the answer to a chaotic immigration 
system and a burgeoning “illegal” population.  They argue that poor enforcement of immigration 
violations contravenes the “rule of law.”  They ignore the traditional sense of the “rule of law” as 
a restraint on government, not a requirement that government fully enforce its laws.  They focus 
on one goal of a legal system (law and order) and one institutional attribute (effective policing).   
Immigrant advocates focus on how the U.S. immigration system violates human rights and 
does not serve appropriate “ends” such as predictable justice or equality under the law.32 They 
also argue that the immigration system lacks the institutional attributes that characterize the rule 
of law.  A growing body of legal reform reports, for example, has decried the retroactive 
application of certain immigration laws, and the lack of clarity in legal standards and decision-
making, the inconsistent application of immigration law, the lack of coherence between 
immigration and other laws.  By this view, closed deportation hearings, a summary appeals 
process, restrictions on judicial review, and the absence of government-appointed counsel 
undermine the rule of law.33 
The “rule of law”—properly understood—allows for an expansive debate that embraces the 
concerns of both immigrant advocates and restrictionists.   For present purposes, it also offers a 
way to think about an immigration system that would further security.  To the extent that the US 
immigration system honors the “rule of law,” it can be a source of support for the United States 
among immigrant communities and U.S. allies.  However, a perception to the contrary can 
facilitate terrorist recruitment.  As the Bush Administration has argued, the rule of law is an 
antidote to the conditions that produce terrorists and allow them to thrive.  This is true not only in 
foreign lands, but here in the United States.  
C. Human rights  
 
The national debate on immigration and security offers a case study in the misuse of human 
rights language.  On the one hand, former Attorney General John Ashcroft has argued that 
 
30 Id. 
31 Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, “Democracy and the Rule of Law,” The International Lawyer, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Fall 
2005), p. 663 (“The rule of law involves four basic requirements: Equality under the law.  A respect for individual 
rights.  An independent and honest judiciary.  And transparent court proceedings.  Without a strong commitment to 
every aspect, even a democratic society will not mature.”). 
32 “Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law” at 28 (“By treating the rule of law as a set of institutions, reformers 
handicap themselves in bringing about the end goals of the rule of law – all of which require reform across 
institutions, as well as cultural and political changes that lie outside the concrete institutional realm.”).  
33 American Bar Association, Commission on Immigration, “American Justice Through Immigrants’ Eyes” (2004); 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., “Placing Immigrants at Risk: The Impact of Our Laws and Policies on 
American Families” (2000); D. Kerwin, “Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel,” MPI Insight , No. 4 (Apr. 
2005). 
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immigration law is an essential tool in the defense of liberty, the source of all rights.  On the 
other hand, civil libertarians have criticized many immigration measures as infringing on human 
rights.  Mostly, the debate has been miscast as one that requires a trade-off between security and 
rights.  Yet a human rights framework can embrace both individual rights and the ends they 
serve, including safety, liberty, and the common good.  In short, the quality of the immigration 
debate depends on a more nuanced view of security and of human rights. 
According to one scholar, human rights in U.S. public discourse tend to be formulated in 
absolute language, in individual terms, and without reference to their ends or to corresponding 
duties.34 By this critique, not only has rights language become more strident and 
uncompromising in recent years, but the litany of claimed rights has expanded.  In the 
immigration debate, there seems to be a sense that if only a desired outcome can be characterized 
as a “right,” this will substantively resolve the underlying issues.  “Rights”—so formulated -- 
may express desirable social outcomes, but they often have little reference to the “common good” 
or other ends.35 This makes rights language less than useful in problem-solving, particularly in 
the face of conflicting rights.   
Consider the potential rights at issue in the immigration debate.  Migrants fleeing persecution 
or gross economic privation enjoy a right to self-preservation.  Historically, this has been viewed 
as a right that carries with it a duty; that is, the right to self-preservation is an “inalienable” 
right.36 To the extent that our immigration system poses a security threat by allowing terrorists to 
enter the United States freely, however, it could likewise be viewed as a threat to the self-
preservation of our citizens.  Certainly, many Americans view the immigration system as an 
ineffective line of defense against terrorism.  On the other hand, many immigration advocates 
believe that our immigration laws offend the right to family reunification, the right to make a 
living, and the right to just working conditions.  Yet many U.S. border residents believe that 
unauthorized migrants violate their right to security and to property.  Some employers see their 
right to support themselves violated by immigration policies that prevent them from hiring 
willing (immigrant) workers.  Some U.S. workers see their rights to a just wage and appropriate 
working conditions undermined by immigrants.  In many ways, these competing sides talk past 
each other, a problem exacerbated by the way they use “rights” arguments. 
It may seem counter-intuitive in our political culture to limit or define rights in reference to 
larger purposes.  Yet the source documents recognize the necessity of meshing individual rights 
and the larger needs of society.  Article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
recognizes “limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements 
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”37 The U.S. 
 
34 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk (Free Press, 1991) at 12, 14.  
35 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997) at 346-347 [hereinafter 
“The Idea of Natural Rights”]. 
36 The Idea of Natural Rights at 236-237. 
37 Natural Law and Natural Rights at 212-213 (Human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration, 
typically set forth rights in two forms: “everyone has the right to” and “no one shall be.” By one reading, the former 
rights would be subject to limitation, but the latter would be absolute.). 
11 
Constitution aims to “form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty.”  Notions like the “common good” or “general welfare” do not conflict with rights.38 
Thomas Jefferson referred to freedom of religion, of the press, and of the person as “the road 
which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.”39 At the same time, Jefferson warned that “[a] 
strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is 
not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, 
are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be 
to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus 
absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.”40 
This begs the question of the relationship between rights and the “common good.”  By one 
view, rights can be seen as setting forth an outline of the “common good” by highlighting “the 
various aspects of individual well-being in community.”41 Claims of conflicting rights can be 
analyzed in relation to these ends and, thus, need not lead to a hopeless conflict. 42 Regardless, 
the “rights” framework can remain a useful way to address issues like immigration and security 
in the post-9/11 era.   
III. Evaluating Security Strategies   
 
Immediately after September 11th, the United States adopted broad security measures designed 
to prevent further attacks.  These measures did not capture significant number of terrorists, but 
they may have deterred or at least inhibited potential terrorists.  To a degree, they also assuaged 
the public’s fear and anger.  The breadth of these measures reflected a paucity of intelligence on 
the terrorist threat and a resulting lack of options to address it.43 
To adopt many of these measures, the government expanded existing powers and took on new 
ones.  Given the American tradition of being wary of large-scale expansions of government 
power, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the government should bear the burden of 
demonstrating that its new powers “materially enhance security” and protect civil liberties.44 As 
a preliminary matter, achieving this goal will require the government to describe how it evaluates 
the success of its tactics.  The government must also be willing to abandon tactics that have 
 
38 Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano and United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Strangers No Longer: 
Together on the Journey of Hope” (Jan. 2003), par. 39 (“... the common good is not served when the basic human 
rights of the individual are violated.”). 
39 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1801. 
40 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, September 20, 1810. 
41 Natural Law and Natural Rights at 214. 
42 Id. at 219. 
43 Interview with Sheila Horan, former Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s National Security Division (Dec. 15, 
2004) [hereinafter “Horan Interview”] (“The government sometimes has few options, but it needs to have some 
security measures in place.  It does no good to say that because we cannot prevent terrorism, we should  not do 
anything.  At the least, we can make it uncomfortable for would-be terrorists.  After 9/11, the measures needed to be 
draconian so that terrorists knew that they would be challenged.”). 
44 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 394-395. 
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proven ineffective or become unnecessary.45 
This report offers a three-pronged framework for evaluating immigration-related security 
measures and tactics.   First, does the measure or strategy relate to a legitimate security goal?  
Second, what does the measure propose to accomplish, will it be successful in achieving that end, 
and how can its success (or failure) be assessed?  Third, is the measure worth the cost both in 
resources and opportunities foregone? 
A. Does the Measure Relate to a Legitimate Security Goal? 
 
Many commentators focus on the appropriate goals of an overall national security strategy 
aimed at the terrorist threat.  Professor Phillip Heymann of Harvard Law School, for example, 
has set forth three goals: (1) reduction of the chance and harm of terrorism; (2) diminishment of 
public fear and anger; and (3) respect for civil liberties and national unity.46 
Heymann’s nuanced view of security does not turn exclusively on reducing the likelihood of an 
attack in the short-term.  He takes a long-term view of what will be necessary to reduce the threat 
of terrorism. Of the three goals he posits, public fear and anger has not commonly been 
considered a core security concern, but it should be.  Terrorists cannot militarily defeat the 
strongest nation in the world and its allies.  Revulsion and fear of terrorism can, however, lead to 
an overreaction that tears at the fabric of our constitutional democracy and our unity as a nation.47 
Heymann’s emphasis on civil liberties and national unity encompasses the need to enlist key 
communities—like immigrants—in order to create sustained counter-terror strategies.  Strategies 
that violate civil rights cannot be sustained over the long haul in our constitutional democracy.  
Strategies that target certain groups can alienate them from law enforcement efforts that depend 
upon their participation in preserving security.48 National unity and civil liberties are linked; if 
the United States does not respect the latter, it cannot hope for the former.  
Under Heymann’s scheme, certain strategies may serve one goal, but undermine another.  
Security involves weighing the impact of particular strategies in relation to all three goals.  Some 
tactics will be so detrimental to one goal or so crucial to another that they will override all other 
considerations.  Torture, for example, violates human rights and undermines national unity, while 
making (at best) only marginal contributions to the other two goals.  For Heymann, strategies that 
 
45 Interview with Bruce Hoffman, Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at the RAND 
Corporation (Feb. 25, 2005) [hereinafter “Hoffman Interview”] (“The danger is that security measures will never go 
away once they’re in place.  They’re carved in stone, although they should go away with diminished risk or if they’re 
proven ineffective.  I worry about more programs and assurances being heaped on top of a number of previous 
programs without ever being revisited to see if the programs are working.”). 
46 Phillip Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning Without War (MIT Press, 2003) at 88-90 
[hereinafter “Terrorism, Freedom and Security”].  
47 “Flynn Interview” (“The biggest danger is not terrorists; it’s what we do to ourselves.”). 
48 Id. (“The U.S. government will not be able to enlist the support of all of its residents, including immigrants, in the 
fight against terrorism unless everybody believes that the government represents them.  Law enforcement must 
remain ‘the good guys’ in immigrant communities and elsewhere.  At the end of the day, it’s about getting the 
broader polity to get to the point where they recognize that they are participants.”). 
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significantly reduce the likelihood and harm of terrorism and public fear, but that also undermine 
civil liberties and national unity, present the hardest choices.  He particularly resists “security” 
measures that would fundamentally alter the U.S. democratic system.  As an example, he cites 
the Administration’s claimed power to detain U.S. citizen “enemy combatants” without judicial 
review.  
Finally, some “security” tactics may not further any of these goals.  For example, denying 
properly screened migrants the right to seek asylum in their country of choice does not further 
security.  U.S. officials have conceded that the U.S.-Canada safe-third country agreement, in 
itself, does not constitute a “counterterrorism measure.”49 Similarly, Haitian boat people as a 
group do not represent a terrorist threat, and their blanket detention does not enhance security.  
B. What Does the Measure Propose to Accomplish, Will it Be Successful, 
and How Can This Be Assessed?   
 
Success in combating terrorism primarily means preventing attacks.50 The threat of certain 
types of attacks (nuclear, chemical, or biological) deserves more resources and government 
deserves more leeway in developing preventive tactics because the great potential for harm from 
those attacks.51 Yet how can prevention be measured?  Occasionally, one can point to an actual 
thwarted attack and can judge what measures led to prevention of the attack.  For example, the 
1997 attempt by two Palestinian suicide bombers to attack the New York City subway system 
was thwarted when a newly-arrived Muslim immigrant decided to tell the New York Police 
Department about the plot.52 In December 1999, an astute inspector on the Canadian border 
stopped Ahmed Ressam, a member of the Armed Islamic Group, who planned to use explosives 
in his car to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on New Year’s Day in 2000.   More 
broadly, intelligence can identify successful or potentially successful terrorist tactics, and provide 
that information to policymakers who can determine counter-tactics.  On occasion, for example, 
detained terrorists have explained what inhibited them.  Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 
mastermind of the September 11th attacks, reportedly credited post-9/11 homeland security 
measures with forcing al Qaeda “to operate less freely in the United States.”53 If true, this 
constitutes a success.  Short of capturing terrorists, counter-terror measures seek to increase the 
costs, limit the possibilities, and disrupt the patterns of terrorists.    
In cases where terrorists succeed, as with the 9/11 terrorists, law enforcement can determine 
retroactively what security measures would have stopped an attack.  Conversely, one can also 
 
49 Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights, The International Human Rights CLINIC, Human Rights 
Program, Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, “Bordering on Failure: the U.S.-Canada Safe Third 
Country Agreement Fifteen Months After Implementation” (Mar. 2006) at 10, n. 45. 
50 “CMS Special Report” at 12. 
51 Interview with James Ziglar, former Commission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Apr. 4, 2005) 
[hereinafter “Ziglar Interview”] (“Protection of nuclear plants and materials and large infrastructure projects is 
crucial and must be given particularly high priority.”). 
52 S. Katz, Jihad in Brooklyn (New American Library, 2005). 
53 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 328. 
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analyze whether tactics designed to net terrorists have failed to do so.  As an example, the fact 
that 137,000 Visas Condor security checks of nationals from 26 countries yielded no terrorists 
should trigger a review of whether the program represents a good use of resources.54 Some 
tactics may close potential loop-holes or address terrorist scenarios that have not, in fact, been 
exploited.  “Red teaming” describes the process of asking experts to imagine what they might do 
if they were terrorists.55 Based on these scenarios, counter-measures can be adopted.  Similarly, 
security experts could identify a list of “indicators” that would trigger an alarm that a certain 
terrorist scenario was being acted upon.56
Often, the success of certain tactics will be subject to debate.  A case in point is the arrest and 
detention of 768 non-citizens encountered during the post-9/11 investigation. Many 
commentators condemned this round-up as an ineffective security measure because of the fear 
created in immigrant communities that made many immigrants less willing to cooperate with law 
enforcement and intelligence officials.  As stated, however, intelligence reports indicate that this 
sweep and other broad measures may have inhibited al Qaeda.  In addition, DOJ officials 
informed the 9/11 Commission that six detainees arrested in this sweep had direct terrorist ties.  
Putting aside the impact of the post-9/11 immigrant detentions on civil liberties and national 
unity, the efficacy of detention and deportation as a measure of success has been controversial.  If 
a person really is a terrorist, releasing the person to his home country does not seem to be an 
effective way to stop a future attack.  Thus, to some counter-terror experts, use of this tactic 
evidences just how few terrorists or terrorist supporters the post-9/11 investigation yielded: they 
do not believe that DOJ officials would deport and lose control over persons who legitimately 
threaten the United States.57 Others maintain that in certain cases the difficulty of prosecuting 
suspected terrorists or detaining them indefinitely makes removal to a distant country the best of 
several bad security options.58 In addition, lack of resources and constraints on interrogation may 
also make removal a preferred option.59 
The House of Lords addressed the interplay between the rights of foreign nationals and 
national security in a case involving the detention of nine persons certified as suspected 
 
54 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Threats and Responses in 2001, Staff 
Statement No. 10” (Apr. 13-14, 2004) at 13. 
55 “Terrorism, Freedom and Security” at 51. 
56 Id. at 74.
57 D. Kerwin, “Undermining Antiterrorism: When National Security and Immigration Policy Collide,” America at 
11, 13 (Harry Brandon, former Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI and head of National Security and 
Counterterrorism, has stated: “I feel strongly that if they had much of any information to go on, they would keep 
custody and control.”).  
58 “Horan Interview” (“There have been few substantive prosecutions.  These cases are difficult to make and, when 
they cannot be, it’s better to have them removed from the country.”). 
59 Interview with Daniel Benjamin, Senior Fellow of International Security at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (Nov. 22, 2004) [hereinafter “Benjamin Interview”] (“Most of the deportees were small fish.  
However, in the case of presumed terrorist activity surrounding the millennium conspiracy in Boston and Brooklyn, 
the country decided to deport those individuals.  Constraints on both resources and interrogation tactics may be 
leading the government to decide that deportation is the best method for handling individuals who are not very 
important in the terrorist world.”). 
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international terrorists.60 After the 9/11 attacks, the United Kingdom (UK) enacted the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 which provided for the indefinite detention – without 
charge or trial -- of those certified as “suspected international terrorists” who could not be 
removed from the UK, either as a matter of law or because no country would accept them.  The 
appellants challenged their detention as a violation of their rights to liberty (Article 5) and non-
discrimination (Article 14) under The European Convention of Human Rights.  Article 15 (1) of 
the Convention, which the UK had invoked, allows derogation from Convention obligations “in 
the time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” provided that such 
measures are “strictly required.”  The House of Lords concluded that the detention measures 
were not “strictly required” or “proportional” because they did not apply to UK nationals, 
permitted the departure of terrorists to countries willing to receive them, and covered persons not 
suspected of posing an active threat.  Analyzing Article 5, the House of Lords reasoned that “the 
choice of an immigration measure to address a security problem had the inevitable result of 
failing adequately to address” the full threat, while leading to the indefinite detention of persons 
“suspected of having Al Qaeda links, who may harbor no hostile intentions towards the United 
Kingdom.”61 It concluded that the measure was impermissibly discriminatory under Article 14: 
“What cannot be justified here is the decision to detain one group of suspected international 
terrorists, defined by nationality or immigration status, and not another.”62 
Terrorist prosecutions represent an objective measure of success, but this potential metric has 
been undercut by DOJ’s practice of counting minor offenses as terrorism-related crimes.  In the 
two years following September 11th, 6,400 persons were referred for prosecution for federal 
terrorism-related crimes, including immigration violations and document fraud.63 “Terrorism” 
prosecutions increased more than three-fold during this period (341 cases in total), but only 16 
convictions resulted in sentences of more than five years.  In the two years preceding the attacks, 
there had been 24 such cases.  
If the record of post-9/11 prosecutions has been unimpressive,64 this may be explained by the 
difficulty of gaining terrorist convictions and the use of Guantanamo Bay and other overseas 
detention facilities in serious cases.65 To many, the failure to apply the civilian criminal justice 
system to suspected terrorists represents an opportunity foregone.  Criminal trials present an 
opportunity to showcase what separates the United States from terrorists. 66 In addition, they can 
 
60 A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent), [2004] UKHL 
56. 
61 Id., §43.  
62 Id., §68. 
63 “The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, “Criminal Terrorism Enforcement Since the 9/11/01 Attacks: 
A TRAC Special Report,” (Syracuse University, Dec. 8, 2003). 
64 “Benjamin Interview (“The prosecutorial record of terrorism cases in the last four years is appalling.”). 
65 Interview with Larry Johnson, CEO of BERG Associates, LLC and former Deputy Director of the U.S. State 
Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism (Dec. 21, 2004) [hereinafter “Johnson Interview”] (“Before 9/11, we had 
more terrorism-related prosecutions than we do now because the Administration is proceeding with military-style 
resolution of these cases.”). 
66 “Johnson Interview” (“The difference between a terrorist state and a civilized nation is that civilized nations allow 
for due process.”). 
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discredit and reduce terrorists in the public imagination, an important counter-terror goal.  This 
occurred in Turkey, for example, during the trial of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK).67 It is why terrorists often insist on being treated as political prisoners.  
For the same reason, the Israeli trial of Adolph Eichmann has been widely viewed as one of the 
most effective prosecutions of a terrorist. 
Trials also establish the state’s power in a way that extraordinary tribunals do not and 
affirmatively demonstrate success in combating terrorism.68 Likewise, public trials may deter 
other terrorists in a way that a closed removal hearing or a military tribunal will not.69
C. Is the Tactic Worth the Cost Both in Resources and Opportunities 
Foregone? 
 
The final criterion for evaluating a security measure involves weighing the cost in resources 
expended and opportunities foregone against its benefit.70 Given limited resources, the United 
States must use its counter-terror resources in ways that will eliminate the most significant 
risks.71 As distasteful or politically unpopular as it may be, full security cannot be guaranteed 
and risk-management must be embraced.  Thus, for example, it has been estimated that it would 
cost $206 billion over five years to deport the nation’s estimated 12 million undocumented 
persons,72 an amount projected to exceed the entire DHS budget for that period.73 This costly 
and bitterly divisive measure would yield few security benefits.  On the other extreme, few would 
dispute the need or cost associated with conducting identity and security screening of persons 
seeking visas to the United States. 
D. A Case Study in Measuring Success—Evaluating The US-VISIT 
 
67 B. Hoffman and K. Cragin, “Four Lessons from Five Countries,” Rand Review (Summer 2002); C. Caryl, “Why 
They Do It,” New York Review of Books (Sept. 22, 2005). 
68 “Johnson Interview” (“The post-9/11 arrests made Americans feel that the government was doing something to 
protect us, as did prosecutions for crimes that funded terrorism.”). 
69 “Hoffman Interview” (“The visibility of a trial has a deterrent effect.  While placing a terrorist in jail for two to 
three years is only a temporary fix in regards to that terrorist, jailing them has a demonstrable deterrent effect on 
other terrorists.  Closed deportation hearings do not provide the visibility necessary for to create a demonstrable 
deterrent effect.”). 
70 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 164 (“No defenses are perfect.  But risks must be calculated; hard choices must 
be made about allocating resources ... Planning does make a difference, identifying where a little money might have 
a large effect.”); “Hoffman Interview (“It may well be that the resources spent on the formation of the DHS should 
have been expended on getting the FBI a modernized computer system.  This kind of calculation needs to be 
made.”). 
71 “Hoffman Interview” (“We cannot protect the United States from all of its vulnerabilities.  The country’s finite 
resources need to be applied wisely.”). 
72  J. Passel, “The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S. (Pew Hispanic Center, 
Mar. 7, 2006); see also, Robert Justich & Betty Ng, The Underground Labor Force Is Rising to the Surface, Bear 
Stearns Asset Management, Jan. 3, 2005, available at http://www.bearstearns.com/bear/bsportal/CorporateHome.do.  
73 Rajeev Goyle and David A. Jaegar, Ph.D, “Deporting the Undocumented: A Cost Assessment” (Center for 
American Progress, July 2005).  
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Program  
 
The Migration Policy Institute’s (MPI’s) report on the US-VISIT program provides the kind of 
analysis contemplated by this report.  It also offers a study in the complexities of evaluating 
particular security programs.74 As stated earlier, US-VISIT attempts to track temporary visitors 
to the United States.  Under the program, visitors provide biometric and biographical data at U.S. 
consulates and again when they enter the United States, and the US-VISIT system checks this 
data against various databases.  US-VISIT is also intended to “check out” visitors, determining 
whether they have left within the permitted period.  Relying on the MPI analysis, we will 
evaluate US-VISIT based on our three criteria. 
1. Does US-VISIT Relate to a Legitimate Security Goal? 
 
US-VISIT attempts to address legitimate security goals: it seeks to prevent the admission of 
terrorists to the United States, to assure that visitors abide by the terms of their admission, and to 
identify potential terrorists who have already entered.  In particular, US-VISIT responds to 
weaknesses exploited by the 9/11 terrorists who entered the United States on temporary visas.  
Many applied for their visas using fraudulent or altered documents and later violated the terms of 
their visas.  Some of the hijackers’ names were on government watchlists at the time they entered 
the United States.  If fully implemented, US-VISIT would arguably have intercepted some of 
them.  As the 9/11 Commission—now called the 9/11 Public Discourse Project—recently stated: 
“It is imperative for national security that the government knows who is coming into our country, 
can effectively verify identities, establishes how long people are here, and when they leave.”75 
An effective entry/exit system would further these goals.    
2. What Does U.S.-VISIT Propose to Accomplish, Will it Be Successful, 
and How Can This Be Assessed?   
 
MPI concluded that the utility of US-VISIT would be limited because “established terrorists” 
would not voluntarily submit biometric and biographical data, and those with “clean” records 
would not be included in watch lists.76 In the alternative, the system might push terrorists to 
enter the United States in another way, perhaps by illegally crossing a border.77 Its effectiveness 
in determining whether a visitor otherwise abided by the terms of his non-immigrant visa—or in 
 
74 Rey Koslowski, “Real Challenges for Virtual Borders: The Implementation of US-VISIT” (Migration Policy 
Institute, June 2005) [hereinafter “The Implementation of US-VISIT”].  
75 9/11 Public Discourse Project, “Report on the Status of 9/11 Commission Recommendations, Part I: Homeland 
Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response” (Sept. 14, 2005). 
76 “The Implementation of US-VISIT” at 3, 25. 
77 Counterterrorism experts are well-aware that defensive counterterrorism measures such as US-VISIT often do not 
work well because of “substitution effects”—and sometimes they increase harm.  See Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. 
Kennedy, & Alison J. Sherley, “The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies: A Campbell Systematic 
Review,” working paper dated January 2006, at 3. 
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other words, did what he or she was admitted to do—would be limited.  In addition, US-VISIT 
covers only 42 percent of those who arrive at airports and seaports, and only two percent of those 
who enter at land borders.78 It does not apply to U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, 
Mexicans with border crossing cards, or most Canadians.79
The MPI report also set forth conditions that must be met for the program to succeed.  The 
system must be accurate enough to assure that lack of an exit record means that the person has 
not left the country.80 Ultimately, the program must collect data on all relevant entries and exits, 
or its data will be incomplete and suspect.81 Finally, DHS must follow up on US-VISIT overstay 
reports.  In a September 2005 report, however, the DHS Office of Inspector General found that 
only a “minuscule” number of potential visa violators reported by US-VISIT, SEVIS, NSEERS 
and the Department of State (DOS) were actually located and removed from the country.82 The 
report faulted, in large part, inadequate US-VISIT data entry procedures and the failure to 
implement its exit system.83 
US-VISIT will also require enhanced physical infrastructure and staffing.84 This could be 
extremely expensive.85 Measures must be taken to guard against fraud, particularly in the exit 
process. 86 US-VISIT must interface efficiently and securely with relevant databases that contain 
biometric and biographical data. 87 The system should not create its own security vulnerabilities 
through the collection of valuable identity information that could be stolen by unscrupulous 
insiders or hackers.  Database security presents a massive challenge, particularly if data on 
international travelers will be shared between nations.88 The program might also have 
unintended, negative consequences, including significant delays at the border.89 
The program’s success will be difficult to measure.  If successful, US-VISIT will foreclose a 
potential avenue of terrorist entry and will serve as an important deterrent.90 No terrorists have 
 
78 E. Lipton, “Border Control Takes One Leap Forward,” New York Times (Dec. 30, 2005). 
79 DHS has suggested that it may eventually enroll all of these groups in US-VISIT.  In the interim, DHS and the 
Department of State have plans to address security concerns with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), 
a program that will require all North American border crossers to have a passport or other secure identification.  
WHTI has been controversial because of its anticipated economic harm to border communities. 
80 “The Implementation of US-VISIT” at 20.  
81 Id. at 44-45. 
82 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, “Review of the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement’s Compliance Enforcement Unit,” OIG-05-50 (Sept. 2005) at 17.   
83 Id. At 20-21. 
84 “The Implementation of US-VISIT” at 33-34. 
85 “Ziglar Interview” (“In order to have an effective exit-entry system, the United States needs to have an effective 
exit system, which is difficult because we lack the infrastructure at  airports, seaports, and land ports. It will require 
significant resources to build this infrastructure.”). 
86 “The Implementation of US-VISIT” at 41-43.  
87 Id. at 45. 
88 Id. at 52. 
89 Id. at 33-34.
90 “Ziglar Interview” (“Even if the program was not one hundred percent effective, it could still serve as a deterrent 
and would catch some terrorists.”).
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yet to be intercepted by the program, although it allegedly has stopped more than 970 persons 
with “histories of criminal or immigration violations.”91 
3. Is US-VISIT Worth the Cost in Resources and Opportunities Foregone? 
 
The cost of US-VISIT’s full implementation could be immense.  In February 2003, DHS 
estimated that US-VISIT would cost $7.2 billion through 2014,92 but with necessary system and 
infrastructure investments the 10-year cost could exceed twice that amount.93 By way of 
comparison, DHS’s budget in 2006 for border and interior immigration enforcement is $9.85 
billion.94 Given this cost, MPI proposes that DHS weigh “the opportunity costs” of deploying 
US-VISIT in relation to other anti-terror strategies.95 In essence, US-VISIT as a tactic should be 
justified against other programs that promise to provide more security at a lower cost.96  This 
should be a standard question for all security strategies.  
IV. Key Priorities in Counter-Terror Fight  
 
The 9/11 Commission stressed that “long-term success [in the fight against terrorism] demands 
the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law 
enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense.”97 It 
identified three broad strategies: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, and remove their 
sanctuaries; (2) prevent the growth of Islamist terrorism through engaging the struggle of ideas, 
stressing educational and economic opportunity, and expanding international cooperation; and 
(3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.98 Immigration, the theme of this report, 
mostly ties into the latter goal, although some immigration programs—such as recruitment of 
foreign language translators and exchange visitor programs—impact the former as well.   
Because terrorism poses an asymmetrical threat—that is, very few terrorists can cause massive 
damage against a militarily superior foe—any security strategy must be “layered” and include 
redundancies.  More than one government agency, as well as foreign allies and private partners, 
 
91 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “US-VISIT Update: DHS Completes Foundation of Biometric Entry 
System” (Dec. 30, 2005). 
92 Testimony of Mr. Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, U.S. 
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93 “The Implementation of US-VISIT” at 10. 
94 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Receives $2.4 Billion Increase for 2006 Appropriations” (Oct. 18, 
2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=4894&print=true.  
95 “The Implementation of US-VISIT” at 52.   
96 Recently, the Government Accountability Office reported that “progress in critical areas has been slow” and that 
DHS had not properly assessed the costs and benefits of the program.  See Government Accountability Office, 
Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 
(February 2006). 
97 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 363-364. 
98 Id. at 365-398. 
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must be looking for terrorists in more than one way.99 Multiple entities, including immigration 
officials, must look at different data in order to identify and track the most dangerous threats.  
Interception strategies should focus on the resources (financial and other), systems 
(communication and travel), criminal activity (smuggling and document forgery), and training 
that terrorists need to carry out their work. 
This paper will not attempt to describe the full range of strategies and resources that must be 
mobilized to reduce the threat of terrorism.100 It will instead highlight a few key counter-terror 
priorities that do not primarily relate to immigration, but which have implications for US 
immigration policy. 
A. The Battle for Hearts and Minds 
 
The United States must break the cycle of terrorist recruitment and replenishment.  Strategies 
to win the hearts and minds of citizens in terrorist-producing states will have positive long-term 
security implications.101 Such strategies can be as simple as providing targeted foreign aid.  For 
example, U.S. aid in response to the October 8th earthquake that killed more than 53,000 
Pakistanis may improve U.S. standing in Pakistan.102 
The war in Iraq looms large in this discussion.  The Bush Administration argues that the war 
will catalyze political and economic reform throughout the Middle East.  This will, in turn, 
diminish terrorism’s appeal to potential recruits.103 On the other hand, a recent classified study 
by the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency has raised concerns that terrorists 
trained in Iraq will disperse and threaten other nations.104 Similarly, the National Intelligence 
Council has warned that “Iraq and other possible conflicts in the future could provide recruitment 
training grounds, technical skills and language proficiency for a new class of terrorists who are 
 
99 Interview with Susan Ginsburg, Senior Counsel and Team Leader for the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter “Ginsburg Interview”] (“A small number of terrorists 
can do a great deal of damage.  Add to that the fact that there is a larger group of ambiguous ‘supporters’ of 
terrorism, and you see that you need to have a lot of people looking at a lot of different issues and types of data in 
order to track the most dangerous threats.  You need to be sure that actions are going to be taken at different times 
and geographical points.  To do this, there is a need to engage the Border Patrol, NGOs, employers, and the police.  
Counter-terror responsibility must be widespread but focused and many screening points must be used.”). 
100 “Johnson Interview” (“The priorities are clear.  We need a comprehensive approach that involves tracking, 
locating and capturing (or killing) would-be terrorist.  We need increased international cooperation to disrupt 
terrorist training and recruitment; enhanced airline and cargo screening and security; improved intelligence 
cooperation between agencies and between federal, state and local authorities; improved entry-exit of travelers; 
tracking of money through cooperation with DEA and banking sources.”). 
101 John Adams used the term “hearts and minds” in reference to the American Revolution: “The Revolution was 
effected before the War commenced.  The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people …. This radical 
change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution.”  
Letter from John Adams, to Hezekiah Niles, Feb. 13, 1818.    
102 D. Rohde, “For Devout Pakistani Muslims, Aid Muddles Loyalties,” New York Times, A3 (Oct. 26. 2005). 
103 The 9/11 Commission Report, 378-379. 
104 W. Strobel, “Iraq seen emerging as prime training ground for terrorists,” Knight Ridder Newspapers (Jul. 4, 
2005). 
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‘professionalized’ and for whom political violence becomes an end in itself.”105 The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which led eventually to the rise of Al Qaeda by providing the 
early Al Qaeda members with training camps and a laboratory for their tactics, provides a 
glimpse of what the future might hold. 
Terrorist recruitment feeds on public opinion.  For this reason, the well-publicized U.S. abuses 
at Abu Ghraib prison, the open-ended detention of “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo Naval 
Base, the use of secret CIA prisons abroad, and recent attempts to exempt the CIA from 
prohibitions against torture may undermine U.S. security in the long-term.  
B. Securing the Support of Allies 
 
The United States depends on its allies in every aspect of its counter-terror strategy, 
particularly in intelligence gathering and military actions.106 The prosecution of al Qaeda 
operative Iyman Farris—a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kashmir—for his role in a plot to 
blow up the Brooklyn Bridge has highlighted the importance of overseas operations.  Faris was 
arrested based on information obtained from an Al Qaeda leader detained overseas.107 
Conversely, actions that isolate the United States or alienate its allies diminish America’s 
ability to prevail in the battle against terrorism.108 Recent months have seen, for example, a 
European Union inquiry into violations of international law related to the CIA’s use of secret 
prisons in Eastern Europe,109 a Canadian Commission of Inquiry into the return of a Canadian 
terrorist suspect from John F. Kennedy Airport to Syria where he reported suffered torture,110 and 
an attempt by an Italian prosecutor to extradite 22 CIA officials for the kidnapping (and rendition 
to Egypt) of Osama Moustafa Hassan Nasr in Milan.111 Likewise, the treatment of immigrants 
in the United States affects U.S. diplomatic relations and public opinion in immigrant-sending 
 
105 National Intelligence Council, “Pervasive Insecurity: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project,” 
available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020_s4.html.  
106 “Johnson Interview” (“The key to effective counter-terror strategy is international cooperation. We need to have 
cooperation and the ability to enter other countries.  A ‘lone cowboy’ approach is ineffective because the United 
States either needs permission or an act of international war to enter a country to locate terrorists.”); “Bearers of 
Global Jihad?” at 27 (“Since September 11th FBI officials say that a significant amount of their intelligence has 
come from overseas captures and detentions .... The second leading source of information is cooperation with foreign 
intelligence services that run informants.”). 
107 R. Leiken, “Bearers of Global Jihad?: Immigration and National Security after 9/11,” (The Nixon Center, 2004) 
at 17 [hereinafter “Bearers of Global Jihad?”]. 
108 “Flynn Interview” (“U.S.-driven policing primarily is going to be what the United States most needs to manage 
the terrorist threat in North America.  When you do things that alienate your neighbor and make it politically difficult 
for them to cooperate, then collaborative options become non-starters.  If you are unilaterally draconian, your 
neighbors will say, ‘take care of it yourself.’”). 
109 G. Kessler, “E.U. Seeks Details on Secret CIA Jails,” Washington Post (Dec. 1, 2005). 
110 Canadian Commission on Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, “Press 
Release: Commissioner Dennis O’Connor releases the Fact Finder’s report on Maher Arar’s treatment in Jordan and 
Syria” (Oct. 27, 2005), available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/ReleaseFinal_oct27.pdf. 
111 J. Crewdson, “Italy Prosecutor, Boss Clash over CIA Case,” Chicago Tribune (Nov. 23, 2005). 
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states.112 Visa restrictions and registration programs, in particular, have led to popular and 
diplomatic protests from Muslim countries.113 
The irregular or extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorists has undermined public support 
for the United States abroad and strained U.S. relations with its allies. The United States engaged 
in such renditions during the 1990s.114 In some cases, the CIA helped other governments to 
identify terrorist cells that operated within their borders.  Suspects would be detained and, with 
logistical help from the United States, delivered to a third country for trial. These operations were 
kept secret so that the country in which the terrorist was found, or the one to which he was 
delivered, were protected from charges that they were acting as lackeys of the United States.115 
In theory, such renditions aid intelligence collection, advance foreign prosecutions, and stop 
individuals from committing acts of terrorism.116 They can also move suspects out of countries 
that may lack the capability and evidence necessary to prosecute them.  
The expanded use of irregular rendition post-9/11 and its connection to countries that practice 
torture has caused a backlash.  At present, the practice of carrying out such renditions threatens to 
worsen perceptions of the United States in terrorist-producing countries and undermine 
America’s relations to it allies.117 In addition, evidence obtained by torture cannot be used in a 
criminal trial, possibly foreclosing one option for dealing with terrorists.  
C. Reform of Government Institutions 
 
The September 11th attacks have led to the most far-reaching reform of the U.S. government’s 
intelligence and security apparatus in its history.   The attacks highlighted, among others, the 
need for (1) the FBI to change from an agency that solved crimes to one that also prevented 
terrorist attacks; (2) the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to infiltrate terrorist groups; (3) the 
nation’s immigration function to be part of a coordinated homeland security strategy; (4) 
improved information sharing between military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies at all 
 
112 Interview with Dr. James Zogby, President of the Arab American Institute (Feb. 13, 2004) (“When I travel 
abroad, I have found that the single most important concern, eclipsing all others, is how we treat Arab and Muslim 
visitors and immigrants to our country.  These measures have made us less popular and make it far less popular for 
governments to cooperate with us.”). 
113 J. Paden and P. Singer, “America Slams the Door (On Its Foot), Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3 (May/June 2003) 
at 13 (“The new measures have such damaging implications for the conduct of foreign affairs that they should no 
longer be viewed in isolation.  Already, the new programs are provoking widespread protests and indignation abroad. 
 Nearly every Muslim ambassador to the United States has raised the matter with the State Department.... More 
widely, the new requirements have become major political issues within the Islamic world, helping to stoke the belief 
that the United States is hostile to Muslims in general.”). 
114 “Benjamin Interview.” 
115 Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror 251-252 (Random House 2002). 
116 G. Kessler, “Rice Defends Tactics Used Against Suspects,” Washington Post (Dec. 6, 2005).
117 “Hoffman Interview” (“The use of rendition breeds cynicism and distrust of the United States across the world.  
The best face that we can put on our country’s recent use of rendition is to attribute the use to the immediate 
emotional response to 9/11.”). 
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levels.118 Yet institutional reform does not, in itself, solve the terrorism challenge.119 It may lead 
to reduced productivity and diminished performance in the short-term.120 In addition, the deeply 
ingrained cultures and distinct missions of the relevant federal agencies inhibit the cohesiveness 
that will be necessary to address the global terrorist threat.121 The relevant agencies face an 
immense task with an uncertain outcome.122 
The FBI offers a case study in the dramatic challenges federal agencies in reconstituting 
themselves to meet this threat.  Terrorism had been an FBI priority prior to the September 11th 
attacks.  The August 1998 al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania underscored the international threat posed by terrorism, and led to the 
formation of Joint Terrorism Task Forces and counter-terrorism squads in almost every FBI field 
office.123 After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the FBI initiated greater reconnaissance 
efforts in large U.S. cities believed to be potential targets.  On a daily basis, squads of counter-
intelligence and counter-terrorism agents built files on terrorist groups, tracked terrorist travel, 
and met with their law enforcement counterparts. 
At the time, the FBI did not have a wealth of institutional knowledge concerning the Middle 
East, but it had the ability to establish electronic intercepts quickly.  At the same time, it had to 
accommodate the political landscape and pressing criminal priorities.  Its agents were mostly 
white males.  Agents of Middle Eastern, Russian, or Vietnamese descent tended to be 
monopolized in overseas investigations.124 The lack of diversity in FBI ranks reduced the 
Bureau’s ability to gather information in local communities.  In addition, the FBI suffered from a 
lack of capable translators.  It aggressively recruited individuals of Middle-Eastern descent, but 
often good candidates did not pass the necessary background checks, typically because of 
relatives abroad.125 The FBI also faced civil rights issues to the extent its work required it to 
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infiltrate religious communities.126 
Historically, the FBI had focused on solving and prosecuting crimes, not preventing attacks.127 
The attempt to change the agency’s mission and culture post-9/11 assumes a competent, willing 
staff.128 Training in this area has increased, but it remains modest.129 Field agents must also 
embrace the turn from a paradigm of traditional law-enforcement investigation to prevention of 
harm to the homeland.  In the field offices where there are actual terrorism cases, the agents find 
that their work is satisfying.130 In contrast, many field agents in smaller offices find the shift to 
terrorism prevention frustrating.  It remains a challenge to create an intelligence gathering, 
terrorism prevention career path in a traditional law enforcement agency.  Meanwhile, the FBI 
must maintain a talented and experienced pool of agents, despite the changes in its mission, new 
work demands, and recruitment of agents by private industry, the CIA, and other agencies.   
The FBI’s traditional law enforcement mission inhibits information sharing in two ways.  First, 
intelligence agencies worry that information provided to the FBI will become publicly 
available.131 Second, the FBI tends to withhold information that it wants to preserve for criminal 
prosecution.132 The FBI did not share information routinely with the INS pre-9/11 largely 
because it did not regard INS as a partner in security issues.133 
The 9/11 Public Discourse Project, comprised of former 9/11 Commission members, recently 
graded the FBI’s progress in several areas.  Highlighting the challenges of reform, the Project 
reported that the FBI had made “insufficient progress” toward developing a “specialized and 
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126 Interview with Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, Lyndon B. Johnson Centennial Chair in National Policy at the 
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133 “Horan Interview.”  
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integrated national security workforce” and “an institutional culture imbued with deep expertise 
in intelligence and national security.”134 In particular, it found “significant deficiencies in the 
FBI’s analytic capabilities; information sharing with other agencies and with local law 
enforcement is still inadequate; leadership of counterterrorism and intelligence has changed 
repeatedly; to date, initiatives to improve information technology capabilities have failed.”135 
D. Intelligence Collection, Mining, Analysis and Sharing 
 
Intelligence collection, mining, analysis, and dissemination undergird counter-terror 
activities.136 Good intelligence allows for proactive counter-terror strategies.137 It allows for 
targeted strategies that do not undermine civil rights and national unity.138 The September 11th 
attacks highlighted grave deficiencies in all three areas.  The US intelligence community had not 
infiltrated al Qaeda and had not collected actionable intelligence.  Key information on Al Qaeda 
and the hijackers that was kept in various federal agencies had not been extracted and pieced 
together in a usable way. Furthermore, it was not shared in a timely enough way to prevent the 
attack.    
1. Intelligence Collection 
 
Intelligence collection against an adversary like Al Qaeda cannot be effective without the 
cooperation of foreign governments and immigrant communities, and without the effective 
integration of law enforcement entities.  The U.S. or its allies must infiltrate terrorist groups, 
work with often unsavory people who have access to these groups, or intercept information 
electronically.139 Infiltration of terrorist groups represents a long-term, daunting challenge, and 
must be part of a multi-faceted strategy.140 Yet its importance will grow as more Al Qaeda-
 
134 The 9/11 Commission Report, 425-426.  
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inspired groups emerge, and these groups recruit new members who do not fit traditional terrorist 
profiles.   
2. Information Mining 
 
Information collection must be coupled with the ability to extract (mine) relevant information 
from various sources and to piece it together in a way that reveals particular threats.  Given the 
vast amount of information collected since 9/11 and the uncertainty regarding what much of it 
means, information analysis represents a significant challenge.141 This need is particularly acute 
in the immigration context, because only a small percentage of the intelligence collected by the 
traditional intelligence community is relevant to border officials.142 
“Mining” has been defined as “looking for suspicious patterns of behavior” or “the behavioral 
characteristics” of terrorists.143 It involves “machine” processing of databases.   Like mining, 
“profiling” requires that criteria be established and screens developed that can lead to terrorists or 
terrorist plots.  Profiling has been controversial in the post-9/11 world.  Civil libertarians criticize 
it, while national security experts laud it as “good law enforcement.”144 To a certain extent, both 
groups talk past each other.  Properly constituted, profiles comprise patterns of behavior, 
experiences, and characteristics that are associated with criminality or terrorism. They can be 
developed by combining information (such as flight training, travel to certain terrorist hotbeds, 
and association with certain persons) or by starting with a category of behavior and subtracting 
information (such as those who purchase vast amounts of fertilizer, minus farmers). 145 In the 
absence of specific or “actionable” intelligence, and properly conceived, mining and profiling are 
important counter-terror tools—but they also require trained security personnel or they may be 
ineffective.  For example, profiles used by the Computer Aided Passenger Pre-Screening system 
(CAPPS), a tool used by airlines to assess passengers, identified several of the 9/11 terrorists.146 
At the time, however, this triggered only additional baggage screening, because airline security 
personnel were not trained to spot and question potential terrorists.147 
141 “Johnson Interview” (“Better human intelligence is a key to preventing terrorist acts, if the information collected 
is properly integrated with information collected from other sources.”). 
142 “Inman Interview” (“Only a tiny amount of information produced by the intelligence community is relevant to the 
border infrastructure.”). 
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144 “CMS Special Report” at 9 (Harry Brandon: “Profiling is a hot-button word.  I will tell you that ‘profiling’ to me, 
in a very simple way, is effective law enforcement.  What has happened is that law enforcement officers in the past – 
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not profiling, that is breaking the law.”). 
145 “Terrorism, Freedom and Security” at 73. 
146 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 1-4. 
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Profiles can be successful when based on intelligence and behavior.148 For example, a profile 
based on how terrorists alter documents (which the 9/11 Commission refer to as “terrorist 
indicators”), how they travel, or the kinds of crimes they commit to support themselves can filter 
potential terror suspects from the mass of innocent people.149 Profiles are much less useful, 
however, when based on broad religious, racial, or ethnic characteristics.  Religion, by itself, 
would be a meaningless characteristic to profile.  It would be an exercise in futility to create a 
profile that encompassed 1.5 billion Muslims, and a potential terrorist could fool the profile 
simply by donning a cross and pretending to be Christian.  Nationality, by itself, is not useful 
given the emergence of radicals from many countries—including the United States—whose first 
loyalty is to a world-wide movement, rather than a particular nation.150 Profiling based on broad 
characteristics tends also to be more destructive of civil liberties and national unity.  The more 
difficult question is whether religion or nationality should be used in profiles that also contain 
behavior or intelligence-based criteria.  Many security experts regard these kinds of profiles as 
appropriate if they reflect solid intelligence; i.e., that terrorists tend to be male, Muslim, to come 
from certain countries, and to engage in certain types of behavior.151 On the other hand, al Qaeda 
has proven adept at recruiting many who do not meet these criteria. 
The latter observation leads to another key point: Whatever the profiles, they must evolve 
because terrorists soon learn and adapt to them.152 Sophisticated criminals do the same.153 
Terrorist profiles based on the 9/11 hijackers—young, single, Arab males—may already be 
outdated.154 Even before 9/11, Al Qaeda sought recruits in non-Arab countries such as the 
Philippines and Indonesia, and even among disaffected groups in the United States.  Intelligence 
has recently disclosed efforts by Islamic terrorist groups to train and develop “white” (non-Arab) 
 
148 “Flynn Interview” (“Intelligence and observing aberrant behavior are the best way to locate terrorists.”). 
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making him less likely to fit the government profile of a terrorist). 
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terrorists in the Balkans who could launch attacks in Europe.155 A Belgian woman, by birth, 
recently conducted a suicide attack against U.S. forces in Iraq.  This appears part of a larger trend 
toward terrorist recruitment of European women.156 Profiling may thus increase the likelihood of 
detecting terrorist attacks “in the short term, but create the possibility of dangerous substitutions 
in the long run.”157 
3. Information Analysis and Sharing 
 
Immigration officials can contribute to intelligence—particularly on terrorist “indicators” or 
techniques for entry—but they still largely depend on intelligence provided to them to stop a 
terrorist.  This intelligence primarily takes two forms—the information available on government 
databases through which immigration officials run identity and security checks on those seeking 
admission, and intelligence on terrorist profiles and methods.  It should be emphasized that 
information collected and mined must also be analyzed.  This involves not simply categorizing 
the vast amounts of information collected, but putting it in context so that it can be used by 
intelligence, law enforcement, and immigration officials.  
Although immigration officials are usually not reluctant to exercise their general authority to 
refuse admission to foreigners who strike them as suspicious, not all terrorists will raise such 
suspicions.  Thus, immigration officials generally cannot be expected to stop a terrorist from 
entering the country if that person does not appear on a database or watch-list.  In September 
2003, the FBI announced plans to develop a single database of suspected terrorists that will be 
accessible to all agencies in the U.S. immigration process.  In August 2004, the Office of 
Inspector General criticized DHS for failing to assume a lead role in consolidating watch lists.158 
Security experts have likewise criticized the lack of progress in this area.159 Databases, of 
course, have significant limitations. For one, they do not capture “clean” operatives; i.e., those 
who have not come to the attention of law enforcement or intelligence officials.160 As a result, it 
has become a priority to integrate human intelligence into them.161 In addition, they must be 
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continually updated.162 To be useful, they must also include more than a person’s name.163 Most 
recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticized the absence of policies and 
procedures to manage the sharing of terrorism-related information.164 The GAO found that 
federal agencies use 56 different designations for “sensitive but unclassified” information, and 
they have no policies to “designate, mark, and handle” this information.165 
Intelligence on terrorist methods and profiles affords immigration officials a tool to identify 
suspicious persons who may not appear on watch lists.166 Usually this information is classified 
in an attempt to prevent terrorists from realizing that governments are aware of their techniques.  
Broad dissemination of this classified information carries the risk that terrorist methods and 
profiles will be leaked, and terrorists will abandon the leaked tactics in favor of new ones.167
Prior to 1992, the Italian government distributed a “Red Book” of the documents used by 
terrorists for travel.  This document allowed border authorities to stop several hundred people.  In 
the mid-1990s, however, Italian authorities found a copy of the book in a mosque and abandoned 
this effort on the theory that the danger of the information reaching terrorists exceeded the 
enforcement benefits.168 Others strongly believe that the benefits of providing border officials 
with sensitive information outweigh the risks.169 
Finally, the importance of well-trained immigration officials cannot be discounted.   An 
experienced inspector prevented Mohamed al Qahtani, a Saudi national later identified as the 
intended 20th hijacker, from entering the U.S. at the Orlando airport on August 4, 2001.   
Qahtani’s documents appeared genuine, but actions and behavior aroused the suspicion of an 
immigration inspector.170 Similarly, a border official in Port Angeles, Washington stopped 
Ahmed Ressam from entering the country, preventing a planned New Year’s Day attack on the 
Los Angeles International Airport; in stopping him and conducting a thorough search of his 
 
162 “Inman Interview” (“An alert list could be useful if it is updated regularly with the names of people known to 
relate to terrorist groups.”); “Ginsburg Interview” (“The challenge is to create a process that is sufficiently nimble to 
get the information in the hands of border agents and keep the information updated.”). 
163 “Johnson Interview” (“The watch list must include information beyond simply a person’s name.  It needs to 
include biometric information if possible, a physical description, and date of birth.  The odds are fairly remote that 
multiple persons would share the same name, physical description, and date of birth.”). 
164 Government Accountability Office, “Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies 
and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information,” GA)-06-385 (Mar. 2006). 
165  Id. at 21. 
166 “Ginsburg Interview” (“You need two levels of scrutiny in the case of border crossing documents: first, is it a 
fraudulent document and second, is it a terrorist-related document?  The indicators on the documents used by fifteen 
of the hijackers were evident on their face and were attributable to Al Qaeda or Islamist extremist groups.”). 
167  Intelligence sharing with the private sector, which controls most of the nation’s critical infrastructure, raises 
additional concerns, as well as legal and technical challenges.  See generally, Homeland Security Advisory Council, 
Private Sector Information Sharing Task Force, “Homeland Security and Information Sharing Between Government 
and the Private Sector” (Aug. 10, 2005). 
168 “Ginsburg interview.”  
169 “Inman Interview”(“The United States has the capacity to operationalize intelligence so that useful information 
can be shared with frontline agents, but at the same time ensure that sensitive information does not get into the hands 
of would-be terrorists.  On balance, it is preferable to spread useful information to border agents—such as the 
hallmarks of passport forgery—rather than to withhold this information.”). 
170 “Bearers of Global Jihad?” at 117. 
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vehicle, the border agent relied on her intuition that Ressam was a suspicious person.  Inspectors 
represent an important last line of defense.  The ability of border officials to identify and 
facilitate the entry of “low risk” travelers, also allows them to identify the high-risk, anomalous 
border crosser.171 The importance of this human dimension argues for more training and 
investment in immigration officials.172 
E. The Need to Enlist Local Law Enforcement 
 
The 1996 Immigration Act allowed the Attorney General to negotiate agreements with states 
and localities that would permit qualified local officials to enforce federal immigration law.173 
Florida and Alabama state police, as well as the Arizona Department of Corrections, have 
entered into these agreements, and the City Counsel in Costa Mesa, California recently voted to 
do so.  Local enforcement of federal immigration violations remains controversial.  Many 
immigrants will not come forward to report crimes or otherwise to cooperate with the police if it 
will lead to their removal or the removal of a loved one.  Similarly, state officials typically lack 
the expertise and resources to enforce specialized federal laws.   
This issue should be distinguished from the need for federal law enforcement, including DHS, 
to coordinate with states and localities in pursuing suspected terrorists.  Terrorists hide, plot, 
commit crimes to support themselves, and try to carry out attacks in states and localities.174 The 
kinds of crimes that terrorists commit to support themselves would be more commonly 
investigated by local police.  Local authorities may also be able to infiltrate communities in 
which terrorists attempt to hide.175 In short, local police may be in a better position to collect 
 
171 “Inman Interview” (“Terrorists tend to become anxious at border check points and the prospect that they would 
demonstrate suspicious behavior is higher if they expect to be highly scrutinized by experienced agents.”); “Flynn 
Interview” (“There is a significant role for cross-border patrol personnel who can identify, by sight, frequent 
travelers.  A human component is necessary to a comprehensive national security system because it allows us to 
facilitate low-risk players and concentrate on higher-risk individuals as well as those for whom we have no 
information.”). 
172 “Flynn Interview” (“While military officers can spend up to 40 percent of their careers being trained and have the 
extra personnel to do this while filling all the positions on the front lines, the extraordinary statistic for border 
officials is that, after basic training, they have no flexibility to take people out of their jobs to receive extra 
training.”). 
173 Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), §287(g). 
174 Remarks by Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton, Final Report of the 9/11 Public 
Discourse Project (Dec. 5, 2005) (“We need improved information sharing not only within the federal government, 
but especially with state and local authorities.  Disasters, whether natural or manmade, happen in localities.  They 
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175 “Flynn Interview” (“Local and state law enforcement are not prepared to deal with immigration issues.  However, 
if immigrant groups are to be penetrated, it will take local and state law enforcement who have the closest ties to 
these communities to succeed at it.”); “Ginsburg Interview” (“Authorities want to know if a person is a terrorist.  
Whether information should be used to enforce our immigration laws is a separate question.  Local law enforcement 
do not generally want to be involved in enforcing immigration law, in part because it decreases individuals’ 
willingness to work with them.”). 
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intelligence, to contribute to investigations, and to monitor suspects, including certain visitors.176 
In the New York City Police Department, roughly 1,000 officers work on counter-terrorism.177 
They collect intelligence from the community, from criminal investigations, from liaison with 
immigrant groups, from monitoring jihadist web-sites and foreign news media, from prisons, 
from tracking financial movements, from witnessing overseas terrorist investigations, from 
federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and from foreign agencies.178 Terrorists’ use 
of “clean operatives” and their attempts to embed members in different communities also argues 
for a broad and coordinated law enforcement approach.179 At the very least, local police 
represent another line of defense against terrorist attacks.180 
To play this role, however, they must have access to the appropriate databases and intelligence. 
Again, making classified information broadly available carries a risk that it will leak,181 but the 
benefits may outweigh the risks.  Prior to 9/11, state and local law enforcement officials had little 
access to relevant information; since 9/11, however, they have been given access to unclassified 
information on possible terrorists through the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File 
(VGTOF) of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system, which is accessible to 
almost every law enforcement officer in the United States.  Federal agencies feed information 
into this file through the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, which consolidates information from 
various watchlists and serves as a central point-of-contact for coordinating state and local 
responses to “hits” on the watchlists.182 
Local and federal law enforcement must also coordinate their work so that they do not 
 
176 “Benjamin Interview” (“DHS needs to have better contact with local law enforcement so that they can relay 
‘pings,’ note license plates, and record where someone of interest is going.  In addition, if there are outstanding 
warrants for arrest, local law enforcement could act without actually enforcing immigration law.  However, local 
police forces would lose important community contacts if they were to enforce immigration law.”);  “Johnson 
Interview” (“Local law enforcement officials already gather significant information within immigrant communities, 
but that they do not have the tools to combine that information together with other information gathered from across 
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177 W. Finnegan, “The Terrorism Beat, How is the NYPD Defending the City?” New Yorker (Jul. 25, 2005) at 58, 
60. 
178 Id. at 64-65. 
179 “Hoffman Interview” (“It is necessary to get more information to lower levels of law enforcement to fight an 
adaptive and invisible network.”). 
180 “Ginsburg Interview” (“The police who apprehend individuals should be able to ask for and review all 
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182 William J. Krouse, Terrorist Identification, Screening, & Tracking Under Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 6, Congressional Research Service (August 4, 2004); “Flynn Interview” (“Local law enforcement does not 
uniformly have a direct link to the national electronic terrorist database.  Making watch list information available to 
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enforcement agencies.”). 
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jeopardize each other’s intelligence gathering efforts, for example, by arresting informants or 
persons being tracked.183 
F. Aviation and Cargo Security 
 
The September 11th attacks highlighted deficiencies in aviation security.184 Post-9/11 measures 
to enhance airline security, including privatization of airport security, searches of carry-on 
luggage, and the requirement that travelers show identification and a boarding pass, have been 
greeted with skepticism.185 More effective measures include locking cockpit doors and effective 
screening for explosives.186 The United States might also consider a “trusted traveler program” 
where travelers can pay a fee, receive biometric scans prior to traveling, and bypass security 
screening.187 
Arriving cargo also represents an area of vulnerability.  More than nine million cargo 
containers—representing nearly one-half of incoming trade—arrive at U.S. seaports each year.188 
In addition, 11 million trucks and 2.4 million railcars enter each year.189 To slow this process 
would have catastrophic financial implications.  Thus far, the United States has adopted a 
strategy of trying to facilitate the entry of legitimate conveyances, while concentrating resources 
on unknown and high-risk traffic. This strategy also enlists the support of corporations that have 
a vested interest in a predictable and efficient border.  In order to receive expedited treatment at 
the border, corporations must secure their own supply chains.190 This system has been criticized 
by those who favor a “trust, but verify” approach to cargo security.191  
183 “Johnson Interview”; “Benjamin Interview” (“If a person of interest runs a red light in Arizona or commits a 
crime that might support his illegal activities, immigration officials need to find out about it.”). 
184 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 391 (“Major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general aviation security.  
These, together with inadequate screening and access controls, continue to present aviation security challenges.”). 
185 “Hoffman Interview” (“Without the continual development of attendant state-of-the-art technology, along with 
appropriate means of intelligence-driven profiling to facilitate more accurate screening, searches of carry-on luggage 
alone can amount to no more than a cosmetic exercise. While cosmetic and bureaucratic measures put in place may 
have a chilling effect on terrorists and would-be attackers for a while, they will eventually be laid bare.”). 
186 “Johnson Interview.” 
187 “Hoffman Interview.”  Both DHS and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have implemented or 
proposed such programs since 9/11; DHS currently has different versions in place, including SENTRI (on the 
southern border) and NEXUS (on the Canadian border). 
188 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, “Fact Sheet: Container Security 
Initiative” (Nov. 2005). 
189 Congressional Research Service, “Border Security: Inspections Practices, Policies, and Issues” (Aug. 2, 2004) 
at 36. 
190 “Johnson Interview” (“It would be useful to have more detailed and specific information about the contents of 
arriving cargo.  This would facilitate the ability to make periodic checks.”).    
191 Testimony of Stephen E. Flynn, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (Mar. 20, 2003). 
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V. What Should Be Expected of the Immigration System as Part of a 
Coordinated National Security Strategy 
 
Two conclusions underlie this paper.  First, the United States must establish a consensus on 
what it expects from its immigration system as part of a coordinated security strategy. 
Establishing such a consensus will require a public discussion of the goals of the US immigration 
system.  
The process of creating such a consensus would serve several purposes.  It would further safety 
by setting forth clear and achievable goals.  It would educate the public to the fact that absolute 
security cannot be guaranteed.192 In addition, developing a consensus would be an exercise in 
building unity.  Finally, it would offer protection against the kind of overreaction that could 
result from further terrorist attacks.  The United States must be able to isolate what systems failed 
in case of an attack and fine-tune its strategies, not shut down entire systems in a self-defeating 
way.193 
Second, the immigration system must be integrated into the national security apparatus.  Prior 
to 9/11, security experts paid very little attention to the nexus between immigration and security. 
Part of this neglect had to do with the complexity of the immigration system.194 Part of it had to 
do with the INS’s failure—due to legal barriers, its distinct mission, lack of resources, or 
dysfunction—to meet the expectations of the FBI and other federal agencies.  Federal agencies 
that turned to the INS for assistance in admitting intelligence assets or for other help195 tended to 
write off the INS if this help was not forthcoming.196 Whatever the cause, federal law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies did not treat INS as a partner in counter-terrorism.  As an 
example, INS was not included in meetings run by Richard Clarke, the anti-terrorism expert from 
the National Security Council.197 The INS developed an anti-terrorism group to address “special 
interest” cases, but it did not focus on al Qaeda.  Prior to the September 11th attacks, INS’s 
attention and energies were mainly focused on its own growing workload and crises like the 
Elian Gonzalez case. 
The low priority placed on immigration as a national security issue was apparent to the 9/11 
 
192 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 395; “Hoffman Interview” (“I fear what could happen when people over-react 
to a terrorist attack in the future.  People do not realize that the measures currently in place are not guarantees.  The 
public needs to be better educated so that it realizes the United States is not a hermetically-sealed bubble.”).  
193 “Flynn Interview” (“After the 9/11 attack, the United States shut down airplanes and borders because there was 
too much uncertainty to risk additional flights.  The approach to the crisis was to first freeze the system, so as to sort 
out the facts, and then proceed from there.  We need to identify solutions that would not involve shutting down 
systems in the wake of a crisis.”). 
194 “Hoffman Interview” (“Immigration is too messy and not well understood in the national security community.”). 
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beggar.”); “CMS Special Report” at 9.  
196 “Benjamin Interview.” 
197 “Ginsburg Interview.” 
34 
Commission.198 The Commission, for example, did not receive all of the immigration and 
customs records that it requested until July 2004, just few weeks before it published its report.  
This delay might be attributed to reluctance within the various agencies, but even more to the 
priority assigned to these requests.199 In addition, the Commission found that, prior to their 
work, few had looked at the issue of border security from the perspective of terrorist mobility or 
travel.  It recommended that greater priority and scrutiny be given to tracking terrorist travel, as 
much as is given to tracking terrorist finance.200 
A. The U.S. Immigration System Should Collect Intelligence on Terrorists 
 
Rather than viewing the U.S. immigration system as solely a recipient of intelligence, the 9/11 
Commission identified it as potentially a key source of intelligence.  It concluded that 
immigration officers, properly trained, can be a unique asset in preventing terrorist attacks.   
Subsequently, Susan Ginsburg, Senior Counsel and team leader for the 9/11 Commission, has 
proposed a far broader strategy targeted at terrorist mobility.201 Ginsburg would elevate terrorist 
travel to the top tier of counter-terror priorities, akin to the priority traditionally placed on troop 
movement. 
1. Terrorist Indicators 
 
In the course of their work, immigration officials often collect information on how people enter 
the United States, conditions in countries from which they come, and what documents they use to 
travel.  This information could be just as valuable in fighting terrorism as it is in stopping 
smugglers, drug dealers, or those who seek to enter the US to work illegally.  Immigration 
officials are uniquely situated to collect information on how terrorists operate, including how 
they forge documents and other techniques that they use to travel.202 They can detect trends, 
patterns, and new terrorist strategies, and can also verify information provided to them on 
terrorist methods.203 However, to date, this information has not been systematically collected, 
analyzed or disseminated.204 
 
198 Id. (“Immigration was not considered a top-tier issue.”). 
199 Id.  
200 “The 9/11 Commission Report” at 385. 
201 S. Ginsburg, “Countering Terrorist Mobility” (Migration Policy Institute, Feb. 2006) at 18 [hereinafter 
“Countering Terrorist Mobility.”]. 
202 “Ginsburg Interview” (“Fraudulent documents can lead to a terrorist in cases where you do not know the person’s 
identity.”). 
203 “Hoffman Interview” (“Terrorists have been known to literally launder passports in order to remove stamps from 
certain countries and to use new passports.  Immigration officials are in the best position to confirm the use of these 
techniques by terrorists and to act on them.”). 
204 “Countering Terrorist Mobility” at 43 (“The well-established methods of developing knowledge through standard 
intelligence and investigative methods should be supplemented by doing a better job of capturing the knowledge of 
front-line officials, and making it available to their colleagues and to policymakers in usable form.”). 
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2. Temporary Visitors 
 
The immigration system must be able to identify who has entered and left the country and, in 
ways that go well beyond even a fully operational US-VISIT program, it must partner with law 
enforcement agencies to collect and track more information on select visitors.205 The 9/11 
terrorist attacks exposed the need for increased scrutiny of non-immigrants, particularly students. 
The hijackers repeatedly entered the United States.  U.S. immigration officials referred several of 
the men to secondary inspection, including one who spoke no English, had no clear address, and 
used a one-way ticket.  Despite discrepancies in the hijackers’ paperwork, immigration officials 
denied only one person admission.  Of those who entered the country more than once, three 
violated the terms of their tourist visas by entering with a plan to enroll in flight school.  One 
never applied to change his visa status from a tourist to student after enrollment.  The other two 
applied to change status, but overstayed their visas, abandoned their change of status applications 
by leaving the country, and failed to secure student visas abroad before attempting to re-enter.  
These violations did not, however, prevent their subsequent re-entries into the United States.  
Based on this experience, security experts have identified an expanded information-collection 
role for the immigration system.  To start, immigration authorities must conduct enhanced 
background checks on certain visitors, which might include running the applicant’s name through 
the relevant databases, verifying his identity, assuring that he has not been involved in radical 
organizations abroad, and identifying the source of funding for his travel and activities 
(particularly education) in the United States.206 Once here, immigration officials could partner 
with law enforcement to monitor with whom select visitors meet and whether they do what they 
were admitted to do.207 If a student, for example, enters the country to study fine arts, but 
abandons or switches his course of studies, this information should be captured and perhaps 
trigger an inquiry into his intentions.208 The immigration system should also be able to remove 
those who violate terms of their admission. 
Few dispute the need to monitor whether foreign students are studying what they were 
admitted to study and otherwise are doing what they said they would.  Universities, of course, 
must play a role in this process. This approach does not argue for decreasing the admission of 
foreign students.  To the contrary, the United States should pursue a more liberal admissions 
policy, given the benefits in good will and talent.209 After September 11th, one of the White 
House Committees had significant concern regarding students in courses of study that could 
 
205 “Flynn Interview (“The U.S. should document visitor stays and departures.  We should have a system in place to 
take the vast majority of law abiding individuals and quickly validate them as legitimate so as to expedite their travel. 
 The real challenge is finding the political will to make the financial investment for so massive a program.”).   
206 “Benjamin Interview.” 
207 Id. (“In a perfect system, DHS would gather and disseminate the maximum amount of information available, 
including: who has entered the country, where the person came from, a person’s recorded alliances with radical 
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208 Id.  
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potentially give them skills to menace the United States.210 In particular, they worried that 
foreign students would receive access to secret technologies or learn to build nuclear or chemical 
weapons.  In retrospect, this concern was likely overstated.211 
3. Intelligence on Conditions Abroad 
 
In 2004, the United States admitted 52,835 refugees from overseas,212 DHS officials awarded 
political asylum to 14,359 persons,213 and Immigration Judges granted political asylum to an 
additional 12,962 persons in removal (deportation) proceedings.214 Asylees and refugees must 
demonstrate “a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”215 Many have fled persecution, 
including persecution by terrorists.  While some in the policy community have emphasized the 
potential threat that asylees and refugees pose, there has been little attention to the benefits that 
they can bestow on the United States.  Asylees and refugees can provide key intelligence on the 
conditions from which they have fled. The intelligence community should make use of this 
information to enhance US security by monitoring both individual claims and overall trends. An 
intentional effort to track asylum trends would also provide a timely record of security and 
human rights issues throughout the world.  In short, refugees and asylees can be an important 
source of information on terrorist-producing conditions.  In certain cases, they can also provide 
information on specific threats.  Their cumulative knowledge, however, has not been tapped by 
the United States. 
B. The U.S. Immigration System Should Recognize that Immigrants Can 
Be the Foot Soldiers in Battle Against Terrorism 
 
U.S. immigration policy can produce the foot soldiers needed for the U.S. fight against 
terrorism.  Intelligence collection requires people with the appropriate language skills and 
cultural understanding.  Immigrants possess these attributes.216 They can infiltrate terrorist 
 
210 “Ziglar Interview” (“A program was explored that would have controlled the courses and majors selected by 
visiting students following 9/11.  This was high on the list, but was never implemented.”). 
211 “Inman Interview” (“The United States does not need to limit the areas of study for foreign students.  The danger 
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groups, translate electronic intercepts, and conduct outreach to communities into which terrorists 
might attempt to blend.    
The battle against terrorism also has a military component.  Immigrants play a key role in 
military operations. Thousands of immigrants serve in all branches of the US military. Without 
them, the U.S. military could not meet its recruiting goals, and it could not fill the need for 
foreign language translators, interpreters, and cultural experts.  Immigrants add valuable diversity 
to the armed forces, and do extremely well, often having significantly lower attrition rates than 
other recruits.217 The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the key role that 
immigrants play in the Department of Defense and called for increased recruitment of native and 
heritage language speakers in all branches of the military.218 
C.   The U.S. Immigration System Should Identify the Foreign-Born Seeking 
to Enter and Stop Those Who Should Not be Admitted 
In the post-9/11 world, the United States must know who is in the country for security 
purposes.  A national identification number with biometric identifiers would be one way to 
accomplish this goal with U.S. citizens.219 However, it would raise significant privacy and civil 
liberties issues.220 It would also be expensive.  In 1997, the Social Security Administration 
estimated that it would cost between $3.9 and $9.2 billion to re-issue social security cards with 
either a cardholder photograph or biometric information to 277 million persons.221  
Biometric identifiers in passports can help to identify those non-citizens who have sought to 
enter the United States or have been admitted.  They also contribute to a system that allows the 
quick validation of low-risk individuals at border crossing points, combined with greater scrutiny 
of others.222 
1.   Visa Waiver Program 
 
immigrants from everywhere who have this understanding.  However, when we view members of target groups as, by 
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Programs that make it difficult for the United States to learn the identity of those seeking to 
enter raise potential security vulnerabilities.  At least three terrorists—Zacarias Moussaoui, 
Richard Reid, and Ahmed Ajaj—used the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) to try to carry out attacks 
on the United States.223 Moussaoui, a French national and convicted 9/11 conspirator, entered 
the United States through the VWP program on February 23, 2001, enrolled in flight school, and 
stayed beyond the program’s 90-day limit.  Reid, a British national, attempted unsuccessfully to 
detonate a “shoe bomb” on a flight to Miami on December 22, 2001.  Ajaj, a conspirator in the 
February 26, 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, used a fraudulent Swedish passport to 
attempt to enter the United States from Pakistan.  Terrorists both live in VWP countries and can 
be expected to use stolen passports from VWP countries.224 A recent quantitative study of more 
than 300 Islamic terrorists found that 41 percent were nationals of Western countries; a quarter of 
them were Europeans.225 
Because the VWP allows visitors for business or pleasure to enter the United States without a 
consular interview or pre-inspection, this program presents a significant security vulnerability.226 
Most visa holders undergo two interviews before being admitted to the United States—one 
interview at the consulate and another at the port of entry.  With the VWP, there is only one 
opportunity for an interview, and that does not normally happen until the individual has reached 
US territory.  Individual with stolen or fraudulently issued European passports have in the past 
entered the United States under the VWP without being detected.  
The security vulnerabilities created by the VWP had become apparent before the September 
11th attacks.  The program was created as pilot program by the 1996 Immigration Act,227 and 
became a permanent program in 2000.228 During its pilot stage, the DOJ Office of Inspector 
General found that terrorists, including a conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 
had used stolen VWP nation passports to attempt to enter the United States.229 INS inspectors 
thought that terrorists and criminals “believed they would receive less scrutiny during the 
inspection process if they applied under the VWP and would have a greater chance of entering 
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without being intercepted.”230 INS efforts to tighten VWP requirements—prompted by 
information on lost or stolen passports in participating nations—encountered significant political 
and diplomatic resistance.231 This comes as little surprise. Roughly one-half of temporary 
visitors to the United States use this program.232 It would significantly increase the workload of 
consular offices to rescind the program.233 In addition, the program provides significant 
economic benefits to the United States and convenience to U.S. travelers.234 
The USA PATRIOT Act required that participating VWP countries certify that they have 
instituted a program to issue machine-readable passports with biometric identifiers, but allowed 
the Secretary of State to waive this requirement until October 1, 2007.  The Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002235 required Visa Waiver countries to report the theft 
of blank passports to the United States and required a review every two years of compliance by 
participating nations with the conditions of the program.  It also postponed the deadline for 
issuing machine-readable passports with biometric identifiers until October 26, 2004.  This 
deadline was subsequently extended to October 25, 2005.  At present, all VWP travelers must 
present machine-readable passports.  The media have reported significant negative impacts on 
travel for countries that have been unable to comply.236 
An April 2004 report by the DHS Inspector General criticized: (1) the program’s uncertain 
leadership; (2) its failure to perform mandatory reviews of participating countries; (3) its failure 
to collect information on the use of fraudulent passports in the program; (4) inadequate training 
on passport fraud for inspectors at ports-of-entry; and (5) the ability of VWP participants to avoid 
the US-VISIT entry/exit system.237 The program remains the U.S. immigration system’s area of 
greatest vulnerability.238 
2.   Refugees and Asylum-Seekers 
Verifying the identity of those seeking admission allays concerns regarding the admission of 
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persons in groups that terrorists might attempt to infiltrate.  In 2004, United States admitted 
52,835 refugees from overseas,239 DHS officials awarded political asylum to 14,359 
“affirmative” applicants,240 and Immigration Judges granted political asylum to 12,962 persons in 
removal (deportation) proceedings.241 Terrorists have exploited the U.S. asylum system in the 
past.242 Their attempt to use the system argues for rigorous identity and security checks.  It does 
not argue for reduced admissions, or for preventing those fleeing persecution from reaching U.S. 
borders through land interception, sea interdiction, or airport pre-inspection programs.243 Nor 
does it argue for turning back migrants at ports-of-entry or even criminally prosecuting them for 
document fraud.  Victims of terror should not become targets of anti-terror programs.244 
Unfortunately, this has occurred in the cases of thousands of Burmese, Colombian, and other 
refugees, as well as hundreds of U.S. asylum-seekers, who have allegedly provided “material 
support” for terrorists, terrorist activity, and terrorist organizations.245 The “material support” 
ground of inadmissibility arguably applies to persons who support the overthrow of brutal 
dictatorships, as well as those who have involuntarily supported terrorist groups. To date, DHS 
and DOS have failed to issue guidelines that might ameliorate its harsh impact.  
D.   The U.S. Immigration System Should Legalize the Flow of Essential 
Workers to the United States and Focus its Resources of High-Risk 
Immigrants    
U.S. border control policies have clearly failed.246 The U.S. undocumented population—now 
estimated at 12 million persons—shows no sign of abating.247 Since 1995, the number of 
unauthorized immigrants coming to the United States has exceeded the number of legally 
admitted immigrants.248 Between 1993 and 2006, U.S. Border Patrol funding more than 
quadrupled from $362 million to $1.8 billion.  Harsher immigration laws have made it harder for 
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immigration violators to gain legal status without long waits outside the United States.  
Convictions for immigration-related crimes, primarily illegal entry and illegal re-entry, rose from 
14,452 in 2001 to 31,208 in 2004, although median sentences fell from 15 month to one month 
during the same period.249 Immigration offenses now represent 33.9 percent of all federal 
criminal convictions, more than twice as high as any other category of offense.250 
At least 460 migrants—a record number—died trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border in 
2005.251 According to Mexican officials, 3,600 migrants have perished since 1994.252 Increased 
border enforcement has pushed migrants to more perilous crossing routes and has contributed to 
the emergence of ever more profitable and sophisticated organized criminal smuggling rings, 
which potential terrorists might try to use to enter the United States.253 The DHS border strategy 
remains to apprehend, detain, and remove migrants at such a high rate that others will 
presumably be deterred from coming.254 Despite a record number of U.S. deportations of 
Mexican nationals in 2005—the Mexican government estimates that 850,000 were deported —
Mexicans and others continue to migrate north.255 Despite the obvious evidence that these 
policies are failing, many lawmakers and administration officials continue to pursue them.   
Much of the support for these failed policies seems to rest on a faulty linkage between 
terrorists and the undocumented population.  Lack of immigration status should not be seen as a 
proxy for heightened security risk.256 Nearly three-quarters of U.S. undocumented residents 
come from Mexico and Latin America, countries not known to be Al Qaeda hotbeds.257 In 
addition, Al Qaeda prefers to use operatives who do not appear on terrorist watch lists or 
criminal databases and who do not have immigration problems.  A study of 212 suspected or 
convicted terrorists in North America and Western Europe concluded that the “main jihadist 
modes of infiltration are legal.”.258 A subsequent analysis of 373 terrorists in the same countries 
found that al Qaeda increased its effort to recruit “clean” operatives in the wake of the 9/11 
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attacks, that only six percent of Islamic terrorists entered their host country illegally, and that 
none entered the United States from Mexico.259 These realities explain why it would be 
dangerous to focus security efforts only on undocumented laborers at critical infrastructure or 
nationally significant work sites; all employees should be scrutinized.260 It is also why 
immigration measures that target the undocumented cannot be assumed to enhance security.  
They may distract security resources from the real threat, and more critically, they may drive the 
undocumented further underground.   
On the other hand, the possibility of undocumented terrorists in the United States cannot be 
dismissed.261 Terrorists have repeatedly breached the U.S.-Canada border. 262 In addition, as 
other means of entry become foreclosed to them, terrorists may also attempt to penetrate the 
U.S.-Mexico border.263 DHS has reported that Al Qaeda’s leadership has considered this mode 
of entry, but has not apparently pursued it.264 Security experts fear, in particular, that human and 
drug smuggling rings hardened enough to regularly abandon migrants to die in the desert would 
be just as willing to profit by conveying a terrorist across the U.S.-Mexico border.265 
It would be preclusively expensive to remove the 12 million undocumented persons from the 
country.  In 2004, the United States removed 202,842, nearly quadruple the number of a decade 
before and the largest number in history.266 This figure, however, represents less than two 
percent of the nation’s undocumented population.  One recent study concludes that it would cost 
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$206 billion over five years to remove the nation’s undocumented persons.267 Although this 
estimate would likely exceed the total DHS budget during this period, it does not include the 
colossal losses to the U.S. economy, which would undermine security much more than the 
benefit from the deportations.  Undocumented workers constitute 5 percent of the U.S. 
workforce,268 and much higher rates of workers in many industries.  For example, they represent 
25 percent of meat and poultry workers, 22 percent of maids, 20 percent of construction workers 
and 18 percent of sewing machine operators.  These industries would collapse without them.  
The U.S. economy—which is projected to create 21.3 million jobs between 2002 and 2012, with 
some of the fastest growth occurring in immigrant-dominated jobs—would stall without these 
workers.269 
Nor does the expense of removing the undocumented include the disastrous social and 
financial consequences for hundreds of thousands of U.S. “mixed-status” families.  An estimated 
3.2 million U.S. children have undocumented parents.270 Sixteen percent of U.S. children age 
six and below, and 11 percent of U.S .children between six and 17, have non-citizen parents.271 
As has been repeatedly demonstrated, policies that destroy families most severely impact their 
children.272 For these reasons, the Bush Administration recognizes the impossibility of mass 
deportations of the undocumented and unauthorized.273 
The immigration system has not just failed to stem the flow of the undocumented.  It has 
contributed to it.  At a time when globalization has reduced barriers to the free flow of goods, 
services, and information, the United States has tightened its immigration policies related to the 
corresponding flow of immigrant labor.274 This anomaly explains the growing U.S. population 
of undocumented laborers and border crossers.275 Simply put, the U.S. immigration system does 
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not offer sufficient legal avenues for needed workers and family members to enter the country.276 
U.S. employment-based visas overwhelming go to highly skilled and professional workers.  Not 
more than 10,000 visas per year are available to less skilled workers.  The inadequacy of this 
number is evidenced by a multi-year backlog in this visa category and by the hundreds of 
thousands of undocumented migrants who find work each year in the United States.  Nor do 
heavily over-subscribed, non-immigrant (temporary) visas for workers come close to meeting the 
demand for foreign-born labor.  Backlogs for family-based visas—depending on nationality and 
family relationship—can span decades.  
1.  A Path to Legal Status 
Given that the status quo cannot be maintained and removal does not constitute a viable 
option, the question becomes how to bring the undocumented out of the shadows for identity and 
security screening.  The Bush Administration recognizes the link between comprehensive 
immigration reform (including more liberalized admissions and legalization policies) and 
security.277 To bring the undocumented forward and to reduce the number of illegal border 
crossers, there must be increased avenues for legal status for persons seeking to enter for valid 
reasons (like work or family).  By reducing the undocumented population and illegal border 
crossing, immigration officials will be able to concentrate their resources on a more manageable 
pool of high-risk border crossers.278 They may also be able to obtain significant intelligence on 
the organized criminal rings that smuggle the undocumented into the country.  As Stephen Flynn 
puts it:  
Many take a draining of the swamp [approach] so any violation of immigration 
laws is viewed as a terrorism loophole.  I prefer an approach whereby channels for 
terrorists to hide in become fewer by creating more reasonable immigration 
policies.  If we legalize those who are here and are coming for valid purposes, we 
can concentrate law enforcement resources on the few bad actors.  As it stands, it 
is not the rule-breakers who create the security risk; instead it is unenforceable 
laws.  Our current system creates larger shadows for would-be terrorists to hide 
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Immigration reform will also diminish the smuggling rings that have arisen in response to 
increased U.S. border enforcement policies.280 Those smuggling rings in fact welcome the 
current push for “enforcement only,” because this policy gives them more profits and a ready 
supply of desperate customers. 
Commentators from a range of perspectives agree with the Bush Administration that 
expanding the legal avenues to immigration—to reflect labor and family realities—will reduce 
illegal migration, a result that will enhance security.281 Demetrios Papademetriou, Executive 
Director of the non-partisan Migration Policy Institute, argues that “law and order measures 
alone are ineffective throughout the world.”282 The Global Commission on International 
Migration—an independent body established by 35 nations to make recommendations on 
international migration to the UN Secretary-General—has determined that the growth in illegal 
migration is, in part, “linked to a lack of regular migration opportunities.”283 The Commission 
recommended that states make “more regular migration opportunities available” for necessary 
workers, and offer “regularization” on a “case-by-case” basis for undocumented persons who 
have achieved “a substantial degree of integration in society.”284 
Scholars from the Heritage Foundation have argued that increased opportunities for lawful 
entry will “make the task of policing borders and coastline more manageable” and that “when the 
only individuals seeking to enter the United States illicitly are terrorists and transnational 
criminals, meeting the challenge of securing our borders will be more realistic.”285 Similarly, a 
coalition of former high-ranking Executive officials involved in immigration and security matters 
has written: “DHS apprehends over 1 million migrants illegally entering the United States each 
year, but perhaps as many as 500,000 get through our defenses every year and add to our already 
staggering illegal immigrant population.  As believers in the free market and the laws of supply 
and demand, we believe border enforcement will fail so long as we refuse to allow these willing 
workers a chance to work legally for a willing employer.”286  
2.  Drivers Licenses 
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If immigration reform represents a pro-security alternative to the status quo, programs that 
push the undocumented further away from government can only hurt security.  The REAL ID Act 
of 2005287 seeks to improve security by forcing states to deny drivers’ licenses to the 
undocumented.  
Rather than enhancing security, however, REAL ID promises to drive the undocumented 
further beyond the government’s reach.  Allowing the undocumented to secure drivers licenses 
brings them forward and registers them in what is effectively the nation’s largest law 
enforcement database. The national debate about the connection between driver licenses and 
security has been characterized by misinformation, and a lack of appreciation of the role that 
driver license and state identification databases play in national security and law enforcement. 
The collective DMV databases are the largest law enforcement databases in the country, with 
records on more individual adults than any other law enforcement databases.  The collective 
DMV databases are the only comprehensive internal security database.  The DHS does not yet 
have a comprehensive database on all adult residents of the United States;288 it maintains records 
only on a few categories of citizens and some aliens—aliens who have provided biometric 
information to DHS through US VISIT,289 aliens who have applied for visas or benefits with 
DHS, some aliens who have been arrested by DHS, or aliens who have voluntarily reported their 
information to DHS.  DHS’s own databases are inferior to the DMV databases: When DHS 
wants to find someone, the primary government database it relies upon is the driver license 
database.290 
Many reflexively view granting drivers licenses to undocumented immigrants as a reward and 
an act of complicity in their violation of the law.  Yet refusing to give drivers licenses to illegal 
immigrants means taking 20 million illegal immigrants out of the largest law enforcement 
database in the country.  Thus, denial of licenses is a policy prescription that hampers law 
enforcement far more than it enhances it.  If those who oppose granting driver licenses and state 
identification documents to illegal immigrants have their way, only US citizens and legal aliens 
will be in the largest law enforcement database in the country.  Thus, when a law enforcement 
official must find someone who happens to be an illegal immigrant, she will have no government 
database in which to look.  Such a policy will make it harder to enforce laws, not easier. Denying 
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licenses to illegal migrants creates a larger haystack of people who are not in any government 
database—but who are in the country, living and working here. 
A policy of denying licenses and state identification documents to illegal migrants will 
inevitably hurt law enforcement.  A multitude of state, local, and federal law enforcement 
agencies access this data on a daily basis to investigate crimes, track down suspects, and prove 
crimes.291 Immigration enforcement authorities rely heavily on this data.  For example, driver 
license data is frequently used to prosecute illegal immigrants for such things as criminal reentry 
after deportation.  DMV data is also used to confirm aliens’ eligibility for government benefits, 
as when an alien must prove that he was present in the United States at a particular point in time. 
 Having DMV data on illegal migrants not only helps law enforcement, but it cuts down on fraud 
in benefits applications. 
E.   The U.S. Immigration System Should Help to Integrate the Foreign-Born  
The recent riots in France by first- and second-generation French citizens of African and Arab 
descent have been attributed, in part, to France’s failure to integrate its ethnic minorities.  Over 
the course of roughly two weeks, the riots spread to 300 towns, led to 115 arrests, and resulted in 
the torching of 600 cars.292 These riots followed the July 7, 2005 subway and bus bombings in 
London by four British citizens of Pakistani origin; the November 2, 2004 murder of film-maker 
Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent; and the March 11, 2004 killing of 191 
persons in Madrid by Moroccan and Algerian immigrants.  These attacks have put the issue of 
integration on the European Union’s front burner; integration has been identified as an antidote 
to the radicalization of ethnic minorities and immigrant communities.293 Legal status, of course, 
represents a pre-condition to integration. 294 It should be emphasized, however, that the terrorist 
threat in Europe often does not originate with immigrants. 295 Many terrorist recruits have proven 
to be well-integrated in many ways, but they do not identify with or feel that they belong in their 
nations.   
The United States has an immigration policy that governs who can enter or stay and who 
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cannot, but it lacks a coordinated policy to integrate its record population of foreign-born 
persons.  Still, integration has traditionally occurred in the United States in a way that it has not 
in Europe.296 Immigrants have a sense that they can become—or have become—Americans.  
The United States must pursue policies that continue this historical trend.  Such policies further 
prosperity by drawing out the talents of the foreign-born.297 In addition, well-integrated 
immigrant communities represent a key asset in the fight against terrorism, as evidenced by the 
dismantling of a terrorist cell in Lackawanna, New York based on a community tip.298 
Conversely, as the European experience indicates, the United States must avoid policies that 
isolate or alienate immigrant communities.299 
F.  The U.S. Immigration System Should Be Able to Distinguish Between 
Measures that Target Immigration Violators and Those that Target 
Terrorists  
U.S. officials need to distinguish between immigration measures that further security and those 
that do not.  Since September 11th, DOJ and DHS have advanced a variety of national security 
theories to justify virtually every immigration control initiative.  Invoking “national security” in 
an indiscriminate way makes it difficult to evaluate particular security measures or engage in risk 
assessment.  It also associates immigrants with terrorism in the mind of the public.  Finally, it 
undermines the government’s credibility with the public and with immigrant communities.  
Consider the following examples. 
The safe-third country agreement between the United States and Canada requires a migrant, 
with some exceptions, to apply for political asylum in whichever country (of the two) that he or 
she first reaches.300 This agreement has led, as predicted, to plummeting political asylum claims 
in Canada.301 It is part of a “smart border” accord that seeks to balance security and trade, but it 
lacks a security rationale.  
The Administration has repeatedly claimed that the interdiction, repatriation, and detention of 
Haitian boat people, including asylum-seekers, serve the nation’s security.  Without these 
“deterrents,” the Administration argues, the U.S. Coast Guard would be diverted by influxes of 
 
296 Id. at 9 (“Thanks to the relative prosperity and assimilation of American Muslims, European Muslim immigrant 
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300 U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, 30 Aug. 2002, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/safe-
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301 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Closing the Front Door on Refugees: Report on Safe Third Country Agreement 
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boat people.302 However, Haitian boat people represent no security threat.303 
DHS has argued that a three-year spike in illegal entries of non-Mexican border crossers 
presents a security risk.  DHS uses its existing detention beds for criminals and national security 
threats, forcing the release of many non-Mexicans who do not ultimately appear for their removal 
hearings.304 DHS has proposed, as a solution, expanding “expedited removal” procedures to 
cover all undocumented persons arrested within 100 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border within 14 
days of entry.305 Under this process, which was originally confined to ports-of-entry, migrants 
who attempt to enter the United States with false or with no documents must express a fear of 
persecution to U.S. immigration officials or face expedited removal.   
On first blush, the illegal entry of non-Mexicans sounds like a daunting security problem, but 
existing procedures already address it.  In FY 2004, Mexicans comprised 93 percent of those 
apprehended for illegal entry.  Non-Mexican entrants overwhelmingly come from four Latin 
American countries—Honduras, Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala.306 The government has 
not designated these countries as having an al Qaeda presence.  More to the point, the Border 
Patrol does not release any immigrants without first identifying and running background checks 
on them through relevant databases.307 If a non-Mexican comes from a “special interest 
country,” the case receives heightened screening and referral to the FBI’s Terrorist Screening 
Center, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and DHS’s National Targeting Center.308 Up until now, 
DHS policy has been to detain suspected terrorists, rather than releasing them.  
The Border Patrol’s new strategy finds that “an ever present threat” exists that terrorists will 
employ the smuggling infrastructure and the “cover” of illegal migrant flows to penetrate the 
United States.309 However, expanding expedited removal will not disrupt smuggling networks.  
In fact, more sophisticated networks—that terrorists might exploit–have sprung up in direct 
response to heightened border enforcement efforts.310 Expanded expedited removal may require 
shorter periods in detention, although it will require that far more people—most of whom 
represent no security threat—will be in detention.  It will also result in more persons being 
returned to nations where they might be persecuted.  Ironically, it will make it more likely that an 
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actual terrorist will simply be liberated in a foreign country where he will be free to make another 
attempt to enter the United States.  If DHS wants to expedite the removal of non-Mexicans to 
improve its control of the U.S.-Mexico border, it could simply hire more Immigration Judges to 
handle these cases in a more expedited fashion.  In short, this measure does not solve a national 
security threat so much as it excuses DHS’s inability to address a management and resource 
challenge.   
On November 17, 2005, DHS announced its intention to try to dissolve an injunction in 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith.311 The Orantes injunction attempted to provide El Salvadorans—
who had been discouraged from applying for asylum because of extraordinarily low approval 
rates in the early 1980s—with the right to an asylum hearing and with access to legal counsel and 
materials.  DHS argues that the injunction should be dissolved because, in part, it interferes with 
its ability to apply expedited removal to Salvadorans. 
DHS claims that because “expedited removal” is crucial to its ability to control the border, the 
Orantes injunction jeopardizes national security.312 Yet Salvadorans pose little security risk and 
procedures to grant them asylum hearings do not undermine security.  Asylum proceedings are in 
reality a valuable opportunity for the government to gain intelligence on conditions within 
another country, cultivate intelligence sources, and investigate potential security threats.  In 
addition, recent reports have confirmed that the expedited removal system returns migrants to 
countries where they may face persecution, torture, and death.313 
It may be that the Coast Guard, Immigration Judges, and the Border Patrol need more 
resources to perform their important jobs.  However, this does not make migration a national 
security issue.  If it were, any number of resource-intensive measures could be seen to jeopardize 
security.  For example, in August 2002, DOJ issued a regulation to streamline the work of the 
immigration appeals court, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  The regulation reduced the 
number of BIA judges, limited de novo factual determinations, and limited panel review of cases. 
 These changes have increased the number of BIA summary affirmances without an opinion and 
short boilerplate decisions.  Predictably, this has led to a surge of appeals of immigration cases to 
federal appeals courts, particularly the Second and Ninth circuits.314 Hundreds of DOJ lawyers 
have been diverted to handle these cases, with potentially significant implications for DOJ’s 
ability to pursue other criminal matters.  Yet the result of BIA streamlining has not been 
identified as a security concern.  
Another group that has been identified as a security threat is arriving aliens who cannot be 
repatriated.  The U.S. Solicitor General has argued that the detention of Cubans and other 
“arriving aliens” is necessary to avoid creating a gap in security that could be exploited by hostile 
governments or organizations.315 His theory seems to be that an enemy government could send 
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its nationals to the United States (with terrorists in the mix), refuse to accept their return, and 
thus assure U.S. infiltration by terrorists.  Yet under the USA PATRIOT Act, a non-citizen whom 
the Attorney General has ‘reasonable grounds’ to certify as a terrorist, terrorist supporter, or 
‘national security’ threat must be detained until his removal.316 If his removal cannot be 
accomplished, he can still be detained for six-month intervals so long as he poses a threat to 
‘national security’ or the ‘safety of the community.’317 Thus, the Solicitor General’s argument is 
disingenuous.  
DHS has also conducted immigration enforcement activities at airports, utility plants, 
skyscrapers, military bases, and other worksites that terrorists might target.  While increased 
security and screening of employees in these work sites is necessary, it should not be based solely 
or even primarily on immigration status.  Yet federal officials have defended the arrest of low-
level Latino airport workers by arguing that their undocumented status makes them vulnerable to 
coercion to commit terrorist acts.318 
The U.S. immigration system has an important role to play in ensuring our nation’s security.  It 
obscures this role and undermines security to argue that Haitian boat people, Canadian asylum-
seekers, El Salvadorans, or indefinite detainees threaten us.     
G.  The U.S. Immigration Service Should Facilitate the Entry of Those Who 
Serve Our National Interest 
After the September 11th attacks, the United States understandably adopted a cautious approach 
to the admission of foreigners.319 This tendency to “err on the side of caution” has led to 
consequences that may, in the long run, threaten U.S. security.  There is a need to reassess certain 
visa procedures,320 and to facilitate border crossings for low-risk persons.321 The U.S. 
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immigration system must block the entry of dangerous persons, but it also furthers security when 
it facilitates the admission of persons who serve our national interests.  As reflected in U.S. 
immigration laws, these include necessary skilled and less skilled workers, family members of 
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent, persons fleeing persecution and refugee-like conditions, and 
temporary visitors who provide a range of economic, cultural and other benefits to the United 
States.  
The U.S.-Canada border provides an important focal point for how our immigration process 
serves U.S. economic interests. Trade between the United States and Canada reached $441.5 
billion in 2003, 37,000 trucks cross the border each day, and 37 states count Canada as the 
largest foreign purchaser of their goods.322 Canada sends 85.8 percent of its exports to the 
United States, and receives 23.4 percent of U.S. exports.323 Overall, more than 200 million 
people cross the U.S.-Canadian border each year.324 
Given this degree of trade and integration, even minor delays at the border can create immense 
losses, particularly for the industries that depend on “just-in-time” contracts to assemble their 
products.  On September 11, 2001, ports-of-entry along this border effectively closed.  Delays 
that averaged 12 hours on September 11th led to the closure of U.S. car assembly plants, 
presented hundreds of Canadian nurses from reporting to U.S. hospitals for work, and otherwise 
worked havoc on bi-national communities across the border. 
In December 2001, the two nations entered a “smart border” agreement, with a 30-step action 
plan, designed to promote security and facilitate lawful border traffic.  The prosperity and 
strength of both countries depends as much on an immigration system that reliably allows goods 
and persons to enter, as it does on one that keeps persons out. 
Similarly, the United States depends heavily on foreign students and workers.  Foreign workers 
represent 22 percent of U.S. scientists and engineers, 40 percent of engineering professors, and 
more than 50 percent of all PhDs in engineering, computer science, and the life sciences.325 
Foreign skilled laborers, PhDs in science and engineering, and graduate students significantly 
increase U.S. scientific innovation, patenting, and research grants.326 Foreign students not only 
contribute financially to universities, but often remain in the United States to work.  Yet U.S. 
immigration policies limit the ability of the United States to attract talented foreign students and 
workers at a time when other nations have begun to court them actively.327 After September 11th,
the admission of foreign students and their families declined from 741,921 in 2001 to 656,373 in 
2004.328 Diminished foreign student enrollment also undermines U.S. standing and influence in 
 
everyone is a potential terrorist until proven otherwise.”). 
322 Government of Canada, “United States-Canada: The World’s Largest Trading Relationship” (Apr. 2004).   
323 Migration Policy Institute, “United States-Canada-Mexico Fact Sheet on Trade and Migration,” No. 11 (Oct. 
2005). 
324 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Background Note: Canada” (Aug. 2005).  
325 “The Flight of the Creative Class” at 11, 99. 
326 G. Chellaraj, K. Maskus, A. Mattoo, “The Contribution of Skilled Immigration and International Graduate 
Students to U.S. Innovation,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3588 (May 2205) at 22-24. 
327 See generally, “The Flight of the Creative Class.” 
328 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, “Temporary Admissions of 
53 
the world, precluding the kind of positive attachment to the United States and to its values that 
many students develop.329 
U.S. military superiority and homeland security also depend heavily on the scientific and 
technical expertise of foreign workers.330 The fact that post-9/11 security-related immigration 
measures risk weakening a crucial source of scientific and technical expertise—the linchpin of 
U.S. military superiority—represents a bitter irony.331 Policymakers must recognize that security 
has as much to do with admitting certain immigrants, as it does with denying entry to others. 
H.  The U.S. Immigration System Should Cultivate Immigrant Communities   
Law enforcement depends on the cooperation of immigrant communities to provide them with 
intelligence on suspicious persons or terrorist plots.  Many immigrant communities, in turn, have 
embraced opportunities to develop ties with the federal law enforcement.332 Immigrants will not 
cooperate with government officials, however, if they think such cooperation will result in their 
removal or some other punishment.333 
Two of the more controversial, post-9/11 immigration initiatives from a security perspective 
were the large-scale arrests and detentions of mostly Muslim men and the call-in registration 
program.  These programs may be viewed as a raw and even understandable response to an 
undefined threat.334 To the extent that measures like these alienate immigrant communities or 
drive them underground, however, they can be self-defeating. 335 
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Under the “special registration” program, Middle-Eastern and South Asian men from 25 
countries, who had entered the United States on temporary visas, were required to come forward 
to be registered, photographed, fingerprinted, and interviewed.336 Of the 83,519 people who 
participated, 13,799 were placed in removal proceedings and 2,870 were detained.337 Thousands 
more fled to Canada and went underground.  Only seven persons captured by this program were 
reported to have had a “potential connection” to terrorism.338 It appears that the program 
captured no terrorists.339 This comes as little surprise because terrorists could not be expected to 
register, and the nations selected for participation did not correspond closely with the 
nationalities of arrested al Qaeda terrorists.340 In at least one case, an Immigration Judge 
terminated deportation proceedings against an Egyptian national whose due process rights had 
been violated when he voluntarily came forward to register for this program.341 In contrast to 
“call in” registration, enhanced border screening for persons from select countries may be a less 
intrusive and more effective counter-terror tool, primarily as a deterrent to terrorist entry.342 
The post-9/11 arrest and detention of 768 mostly Middle Eastern and South Asian men 
terrified the targeted communities.  Many detainees were held for weeks without a formal charge, 
and 531 were deported following closed hearings.  DOJ refused to release their names on 
national security grounds, arguing that to do so would give terrorists important clues about the 
U.S. investigation.343 An April 2003 report by DOJ’s Office of Inspector General studied the 
experience of detainees at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York and the 
Passaic County Jail in Paterson, New Jersey.344 This report documents the arrest and detention of 
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hundreds of persons with no connection to terrorism.345 Detainees were held in harsh, maximum 
security conditions, and suffered mental and physical abuse.346 The FBI took an average of 80 
days to clear innocent detainees and held detainees even after it became clear that they had 
nothing to do with terrorism.347 While these delays can be attributed to staffing shortages, they 
nonetheless undermined confidence in the program,348 as did the program’s excessive secrecy.349 
In short, the program alienated both the targeted immigrant communities and their nations of 
origin.350 The 9/11 Commission reported that this program netted six “special interest detainees” 
who had direct links to terrorist organizations and that the overall effort had provided important 
leads.   However, this level of success may be overstated.351 
VI.  Recommendations 
 
Our review of the relationship between immigration policy and national security compels us to 
offer five policy recommendations, some in the form of broad principles and others focused on 
individual strategies.  First, we recommend that the United States adopt an expansive view of 
national security—that encompasses economic security and respect for core civic values—in  
crafting immigration policy.  Our economic strength undergirds our anti-terror activities.  In 
addition, only those security strategies that respect civil liberties can be sustained in the long-
term in our constitutional democracy.  Similarly, U.S. security strategies should respect the rule 
of law, both as a way to create durable programs and to secure the full support of our overseas 
allies and immigrant communities.  In our view, the “rule of law” embraces a range of goals and 
institutional attributes that characterize well-functioning legal systems.  We also support a view 
of individual rights that meshes with notions like the “common good” and the “general welfare.” 
 
Second, we recommend that immigration measures be rigorously evaluated to determine if they 
further legitimate security goals, will be likely to accomplish their purposes, and are worth the 
cost in resources expended and opportunities foregone.  We agree that appropriate “security” 
goals will seek to reduce the chance and harm of terrorism, to diminish public fear and anger, and 
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to promote civil liberties and national unity.  We question the security rationale offered for 
immigration measures that have targeted Haitian boat people, indefinite detainees, Canadian-
bound asylum seekers, detained El Salvadorans, and certain refugees and asylum-seekers accused 
of providing “material support” to terrorists.  We support a “risk management” approach to 
counter-terrorism that seeks to realize the greatest security benefits from the finite resources 
available.  We do not think that trying to prosecute and to deport 12 million undocumented 
persons represents a viable, much less a cost-effective security strategy. 
 
Third, we agree with the 9/11 Commission on the need for the United States to develop a 
comprehensive and coordinated national security plan that incorporates military action, 
diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, homeland 
security, and immigration policy.  We think that the U.S. immigration system has an important 
role to play in a coordinated fight against terrorism.  Having said this, we recognize that many 
counter-terror priorities do not primarily implicate our immigration system.  According to our 
research, key components of a counter-terror strategy include: a multi-faceted strategy to break 
the cycle of terrorist recruitment and replenishment through an appeal to the “hearts and minds” 
of persons in terrorist-producing states; expedited restructuring of the U.S. intelligence, law 
enforcement, and homeland security infrastructure; strengthened intelligence collection, mining, 
analysis, and sharing capabilities; and the full engagement of local police in the attempt to 
identify, locate, and infiltrate terrorist groups.  
 
Fourth, we think that the U.S. immigration system should be able to conduct identity and security 
checks on those seeking to enter and to secure legal status.  In addition, it should be able to stop 
those from entering who appear on watch lists or who otherwise meet behavior- and intelligence-
based profiles. We distinguish between profiles based primarily on religion, nationality or race 
(which we oppose), and those based on behavior and evolving intelligence (which we support as 
indispensable security tools). Conversely, we think that the U.S. immigration system should 
facilitate the admission of persons who contribute to our economic security and our safety.  In 
particular, we support visa policies that would increase the admission of foreign students, 
scientists, engineers, and others.  Our immigration system should also be able to help locate 
certain visitors to the country and to assure that they respect the conditions of their admission.  
As the 9/11 Commission recognized, immigration officials are uniquely situated to collect 
intelligence on terrorist travel methods.  This information should be collected, analyzed and 
disseminated in a systematic way.  An effective immigration system would improve U.S. 
standing in immigrant communities and in terrorist-producing countries.  It would also 
significantly reduce illegal entries into the country.  We recommend that the United States 
develop a coordinated program to integrate the foreign-born.  Recent events in Europe have 
affirmed the importance of immigrant integration to security.  Additionally, we view U.S. 
immigrant communities as vital players in military action, intelligence gathering, law 
enforcement and (indeed) all aspects of our fight against terrorism.  
 
Fifth, we recommend that Congress pass comprehensive immigration reform as a way to enhance 
U.S. security.  Expanded avenues for the legal entry of immigrant laborers and family members 
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will necessarily reduce illegal entries, and will allow the United States to concentrate its 
enforcement resources on those who might present a danger.  A path to legal status for a 
significant percentage of 12 undocumented persons will bring these people out of the shadows, 
and allow the United States to run identity and security checks on them.  For the same reason, we 
support providing other incentives—like offering driver’s licenses—that would bring the 
undocumented to the government’s attention.   By contrast, an “enforcement only” approach to 
reform will drive immigrants further away from law enforcement.  Comprehensive immigration 
reform may be the most pressing immigration-related security need facing our nation.  
